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Articles
THE VIRULENCE OF THE NATIONAL APPETITE FOR
BOGUS REVELATION
KERMIT

L. HALL*

INTRODUCTION

The specter of conspiracy has haunted Americans throughout the
second half of the twentieth century.1 In the 1950s, Senator Joseph
* Dean, College of Humanities; Executive Dean, Colleges of Arts and Sciences; and
Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University. Ph.D., University of Minnesota;
M.S.L., Yale Law School. This Article was presented as the Judge Simon E. Sobeloff lecture
at the University of Maryland School of Law on February 28, 1996. My thanks to Barbara
Terzian, Jeff Marquis, and Kenneth Wasserman for their research support and to John
Johnson, Donald G. Gifford, and Howard Leichter for their comments and suggestions
about earlier versions of this Article. I am especially grateful to Sheryl Walter for her suggestions about sources and her willingness to share her extensive knowledge of the secondary literature on openness of and access to government records.
For the title of this Article, I am indebted to one of Baltimore's favorite citizens, H.L.
Mencken, who, in another context, commented on "the virulence of the racial appetite for
bogus revelation." H.L. MENCKEN, A BOOK OF PREFACES 23-24 (1917).
1. This phenomenon is not unique to the modern era. There are many comprehensive historical accounts of the specter of conspiracy in America. See, e.g., VIRGINIA CARMICHAEL, FRAMING HISTORY- THE ROSENBERG STORY AND THE COLD WAR (1993) (analyzing
and tracing the "politically motivated production of the official Rosenberg story and the
historical and cultural critiques performed by its re-presentation in literature, drama and
the visual arts"); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID

STYLE (1969) (discussing the theory that slaveowners conspired against the rest of the
country); THE FEAR OF CONSPIRACY. IMAGES OF UN-AMERICAN SUBVERSION FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT xxiii (David Brion Davis ed., 1971) ("[T]he main purpose of
this book is to use images of conspiracy and subversion as a means of studying American
tensions, values, and expectations.

..

."); RICHARD HOFSTADER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN

AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAY (1965) (examining the popularity of conspiracy theories); GEORGE JOHNSON, ARCHITECTS OF FEAR: CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND PARANOIA IN
AMERICAN POLrICS (1983) (demystifying conspiracy theorists and the objects of their theo-
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McCarthy's Communist conspiracy theory-the "second Red Scare"traumatized the nation and destroyed lives. 2 More recently, David Irving's explanation of the Holocaust as an enormous historical
fabrication' has defied logic and distorted reality. 4 Even Abraham
Lincoln rests uneasily in his grave, as theorists of his murder advance
plots so tangled that only the exhumation of John Wilkes Booth's
bones can unravel them. 5
These are compelling examples of the American appetite for intrigue, but no other event in twentieth-century American history has
generated such persistent notions of conspiracy as the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. More than four hundred books have
been published on the subject;' a major newsletter provides a continuries); DONALDJ. Lisio, THE PRESIDENT AND PROTEST: HOOVER, CONSPIRACY, AND THE BONUS
RIOT (1974) (arguing that the proliferation of conspiracy theories causes "gross distortions" in our understanding of the Bonus Riot and Hoover's presidency); MICHAEL SAYERS
& ALBERT E. KAHN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY. THE SECRET WAR AGAINST SOVIET RussIA
(1946) (recounting the history of espionage in the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1945).
2. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OFJOE McCARTHY 102
(1983) (chronicling the life ofJoseph McCarthy and the effects of the "second Red Scare"

on the American psyche).
3. See DAVID IRVING, GOEBBELS (1996); see also ARTHUR R. Burz, THE HoAX
TWENTIETH CENTURY:

THE CASE AGAINST THE PRESUMED EXTERMINATION

OF THE

OF EUROPEAN

JEwRY 8 (1976) (calling the Holocaust a hoax and a "monstrous lie").

4. See

DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOcAUsT:

THE GROWING ASSAULT ON

TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993) (examining and discrediting the arguments of Holocaust
deniers).
5. See Edward Colimore, The Search for Lincoln's Assassin, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 28,
1992, at CI, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Dentist Examines Lincoln

Slaying: Seeks to Exhume Body Buried As Booth's, Compare Teeth with Record, ST. Louis POSTApr. 18, 1994, (Illinois) at 6, available in 1994 WL 8195597; Hmm, How Do We
Really Know Who's Buried in Grant's Tomb?, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1992, at C2, available in
DISPATCH,

LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; OurAmerican Corpses, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, at
F2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Who's Buried in John Wilkes Booth's
Tomb?, U.P.I., Sept. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.

6. See, e.g.,

ROBERT SAM ANSON, "THEY'VE KILLED THE PRESIDENT!":

THE SEARCH FOR

THE MURDERERS OFJOHN F. KENNEDY (1975) (calling for a new investigation ofJFK's assassi-

G. ROBERT BLAKEY & RICHARD BILLINGS, THE PLOT TO KILL THE PRESIDENT (1981)
(explaining the conclusion of the Select Committee on Assassinations that organized crime
was behind the plot to kill JFK);JOHN DAVIS, MAFIA KINGFISH: CARLOS MARCELLO AND THE
nation);

ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY (1989) (examining the theory that the New Orleans
Mafia was behind JFK's assassination); EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, THE ASSASSINATION CHRONICLES: INQUEST, COUNTERPLOT, AND LEGEND (1992) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TRILOGY] (trilogy
examining the Warren Commission Report the investigation conducted by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, and the life of Lee Harvey Oswald); ROBERTJ. GRODEN & HARRISON EDWARD LIVINGSTONE, HIGH TREASON: THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY WHAT REALLY HAPPENED (1989) (claiming that the CIA, organized crime, and
right-wing politicians killed JFK); HENRY HURT, REASONABLE DOUBT (1985) (concluding
that Oswald did not act alone); MARK LANE, RUSH TO JUDGMENT (1966) (arguing that the
Warren Commission admitted hearsay and ignored important evidence); DAVID S. LIFTON,
BEST EVIDENCE: DISGUISE AND DECEPTION IN THE ASSASSINATION OFJOHN F. KENNEDY (1981)
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ing flow of new theories about the assassination; 7 and a national organization, the Coalition on Political Assassinations, meets annually to
debate the murder.' Oliver Stone elevated the idea of conspiracy to
epic proportions in the film JFK9 That movie claims, among other
things, that Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone; rather, he was part
of a plot hatched by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collaboration with organized crime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and other elements of the American government.1 0 Stone's follow-up to JFY, Nixon, t" echoes this theme, intimating a connection between the Cuban burglars of the Watergate complex and the
12
assassination of President Kennedy.

(concluding that a second bullet was removed from JFK's head); JOHN NEWMAN, OSWALD
AND THE CIA (1995) (arguing that the CIA was interested in Oswald since 1959, and that,
"whether witting or not, Oswald became involved in CIA operations"); GERALD L. POSNER,
CASE CLOSED: LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND THE ASSASSINATION OFJFK (1993)

(concluding that

Oswald acted alone); FRANK RACANO & SELWYN RAAB, MOB LAWYER (1994) (identifying Mafia bosses who planned JFK's assassination); HAROLD WEISBERG, FRAME-UP: THE MARTIN
LUTHER KING/JAMES EARL RAY CASE (1971) (drawing a parallel between theJFK conspiracy

and the "framing" ofJames Earl Ray in Dr. King's murder).
7. See OPEN SECRETS (Coalition on Political Assassinations, Washington, D.C.), Aug.
1994.

8. SeeJohn Hanchette, JFK Conspiracy Theorists Announce October Convention, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 26, 1994, available in 1994 WL 11247865; Washington Daybook, Today's
Headliners,WASH. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at All.
9. JFK (Warner Bros. 1991).
10. See David Ansen, A Troublemakerfor Our Times, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at 50; Robert Brustein, .JFK NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1992, at 26, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Magazine File; Richard Corliss, Who KiUedJFK?, TIME, Dec. 23, 1991, at 66, available in 1991
WL 3116696; Stuart Klawans, JFK NATION, Jan. 20, 1992, at 62, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Magazine File; John Simon, JFK, NAT'L REV., Mar. 2, 1992, at 54, available in

LEXIS, Nexis library, Magazine File; Jay Carr, Oliver Stone's JFK'Fightsthe Right Fight, BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1991, Arts & Film at 53, available in 1991 WL 7514478; Renee Loth,
Oliver Stone's ffK' Reopens Old Wounds in a Society That Often Views Life Through Pop Culture:
Film May Force Reexamination, BosrON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 1991, at A19, available in 1991 WL
7514694; Kenneth Turan, JFK': Conspiracy in the Cross Hairs,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at
F2, available in 1001 WL 2190825; Crossfire(CNN television broadcast, Dec. 23, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File.
11. NIXON (Walt Disney 1995).
12. See Stanley Kauffmann, Cast of Character,NEW REPUBLIC,Jan. 22, 1996, at 26; Christopher Sharrett, Nixon, USA TODAY, May 1996, Magazine at 49; Jay Carr, Baring the Heart of
Nixon, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1995, Arts & Film at 33, available in 1995 WL 5966891;
Stephen Hunter, ResurrectingNixon, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 1995, at 1E, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Majpap File; Barbara Shulgasser, 'Nixon': It Has All the Charm of a Lab Rat,
SAN. FRAN. EXAMINER, Dec. 20, 1995, at Cl, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper
File; Kenneth Turan, 'Nixon,' the Enigma, LA. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1995, at Fl, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Lat File; Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 27, 1995), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File.
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This Article addresses the Kennedy murder, generally; the work
of the Assassination Records Review Board, primarily;1 3 and issues of
secrecy and openness in government, specifically. In short, the Article
considers the competing values of openness and secrecy in government.1 4 Gaining access to secret documents is vital, but one must consider the cost of broken confidences to our security. A sense of
conflict between these views inspired this Article.
I.

THE WARREN COMMISSION

The Warren Commission and its report stand at the center of almost all Kennedy conspiracy theories.15 A year after the assassination,
the Report was issued by seven sober-minded Americans, headed by
Chief Justice Earl Warren.' 6 Initially, the Report, which concluded
that Oswald was the lone assassin, 7 received strong support. Polling
data indicates that prior to the Report's release, only twenty-nine percent of the public believed that Oswald was solely responsible for the
assassination of President Kennedy; following its release a year later,
in 1964, that number increased to eighty-seven percent. However, two
years later, in 1966, only thirty-six percent of Americans indicated they
13. The author sits as a member of the Assassination Records Review Board. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views of the
other members of the Board.
The other members of the Board are the HonorableJohn R. Tunheim, United States
District Judge, District of Minnesota; Henry Graff, Professor Emeritus, Columbia University; William Joyce, Rare Books Librarian, Firestone Library, Princeton University; and
Anna K Nelson, Adjunct Professor of History, American University.
The Assassination Records Review Board will hereinafter be referred to as the "JFK
Board" or the "Board."
Throughout this Article, references are made to the views of the various intelligence
agencies. These references are based upon the author's knowledge of these representations made to the Assassination Records Review Board, the context of which remains
classified.
14. See generally Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PrrT. L. REv. 579,
583 (1986) (arguing that secrecy issues "present a fundamentally different problem in
terms of first amendment theory than those that have been central to the development of
first amendment jurisprudence" and that "society is distinctly ambivalent about the benefits of increased knowledge").
15. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
(1964) [hereinafter WARREN COMMISSION REPORT].

16. The members of the Warren Commission were ChiefJustice Earl Warren, Senator
Richard B. Russell, SenatorJohn Sherman Cooper, Representative Hale Boggs, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy. See id. at v.
17. "On the basis of the evidence before the Commission it concludes that Oswald
acted alone." Id. at 22.
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believed the Report.1 8 By the time JFK opened in the movie houses of
America,1 9 public confidence in the Commission's Report had sunk
even further, with about seventy percent of Americans concluding
that Oswald did not act alone. ° The movie, therefore, tapped a deep
wellspring of distrust of the Report rather than, as is sometimes implied,"1 fostered it.
Events between 1964 and 1992 did much to undermine trust in
the Warren Commission Report. An assassination research community
quickly appeared, raising troubling questions about the Report and
propagating theories of conspiracy.2 2 Books entitled Whitewash,23 Contract on America,24 Conspiracy,25 and Rush toJudgmenj 6 eroded the credibility of the Commission's findings.2 7 President Kennedy's murder,
moreover, was only one of several prominent political killings. Assassins also gunned down Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and Malcolm X and gravely wounded Governor George C. Wallace.2 8
18. These figures are based on CBS and Gallup polling data recapitulated in a poll
released a week before the thirtieth anniversary of the assassination. See Nine Out of 10

Americans Doubt Oswald Acted Alone, REUTERS, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; see also Max Holland, The Key to the Warren Report, Am.HERITAGE, Nov.
1995, at 50, 52 ("Prior to [the Report's] release, a Gallup poll found that only 29 percent
of Americans thought Oswald had acted alone, afterward 87 percent believed so.").
19. SeeJFK, supra note 9.
20. See 82 % in Poll Say the Truth Wasn't Told inJFKDeath: Seven of 10 Suspect There Was a
Conspiracy, BUFF.NEWS, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL 6126092 ("[Sleven in 10
Americans suspect a conspiracy, and those who were young on Nov[ember] 22, 1963, are
especially likely to be among the 82 percent who believe the truth has not been told. In
keeping with many recent polls that show Americans are distrustful toward government, 78
percent think there was an official coverup."). Indeed, there is now a much more conspiracy-minded attitude toward the assassination than there was even 15 years ago. See id.
21. See, e.g., Brustein, supra note 10 ("Viewers ofJFK... might find themselves shaken
in their views of government, society, the media.").
22. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 412-19 (describing the "network of amateur sleuths"
who checked the accuracy of the Warren Commission Report and challenged its conclusions).
23. HAROLD WEISBERG, WHITEWASH (1965) (stating that the Warren Commission did
not consider any alternatives to Oswald as sole assassin).
24. DAVID E. SCHEIM, CONTRACT ON AMERICA: THE MAFIA MURDERS OF JOHN
ERT KENNEDY 263 (1983) (concluding that the Mafia killed President Kennedy).

AND

ROB-

25. ANTHONY SUMMERS, CONSPIRACY 523 (1980) (calling for a new investigation).
26. LANE, supra note 6.
27. See Weisberg, supra note 23, at 189 ("In writing this book, the author has had but
one purpose. That was to show that the job assigned to and expected of the President's
Commission on the Assassination ofJohn F. Kennedy has not been done."); SCHEIM, supra
note 24, at 2-3 (finding that "evidence that established [Jack Ruby's] criminal ties has been
repeatedly suppressed or distorted by the Warren Commission"); SUMMERS, supra note 25;
LANE, supra note 6, at 378 ("[T] he Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy is less a report than a brief for the prosecution.").
28. See D'ARMY BAILEY, MINE EVES HAVE SEEN: DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'S FINAL
JOURNEY (1993) (providing a pictorial account of King's final journey to Memphis);
GEORGE BREITMAN ET AL., THE ASSASSINATION OF MALCOLM X (1976) (arguing that the CIA
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At the same time, the American government resorted to deception to
disguise its policy failures. 9 The nation fought and lost a bloody conflict in Southeast Asia-an undeclared war fostering doctored casualty
reports;3 0 secret missions into Cambodia and Laos;3 1 purported attacks on the destroyers, Maddox and C. TurnerJoy;32 and President
Richard Nixon's "secret plan" to end the war. 3 The plan took five
years, cost many thousands of additional American and Vietnamese
and FBI participated in the assassination of Malcolm X); KARL EvANZZ, THEJUDAS FACTOR:
THE PLOT TO KILL MALCOLM X (1992) (concluding that government agencies were involved in the assassination); GEROLD FRANK, AN AMERICAN DEATH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE
ASSASSINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1972) (concluding that James Earl Ray
alone killed King); MICHAEL FRIEDLY, MALCOLM X: THE ASSASSINATION (1992) (concluding
that Muslims killed Malcolm X); ROBERT BLAIR KAISER, "R.F.K. MUST DIE!" (1970) (exploring various conspiracy theories); THREE ASSASSINATIONS: THE DEATHS OF JOHN & ROBERT
KENNEDY AND MARTIN LUTHER KING (Janet M. Knight ed., 1971) (providing "a factual account of the assassinations" based on "FACTS ON FILE, the press, and U.S. government studies"); STEPHAN LESHER, GEORGE WALLACE (1994) (describing Arthur Bremer's attempt on
Wallace's life); PHILIP H. MELANSON, THE ROBERT F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION 13 (1991)

(concluding that Sirhan Sirhan was "hypnotically programmed to attack [Robert F.] Kennedy"); PHILIP MELANSON, WHO KILLED MARTIN LUTHER KING? (1993) (calling for an investigation of possible CIA and FBI involvement); DAN E. MOLDEA, THE KILLING OF ROBERT F.
KENNEDY 323 (1995)

(concluding that Sirhan Sirhan assassinated Robert F. Kennedy to
prove "that he still had his nerve"); WILLIAM W. TURNER &JOHN G.CHRISTIAN, THE ASSASSINATION OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY (1978) (claiming that there was a conspiracy); WEISBERG,
supra note 6 (concluding that James Earl Ray was framed for the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Jr.).
29. Regarding the government's use of intelligence materials in the Vietnam War and
the bogus nature of much of the reporting about the War, see SAM ADAMS, WAR OF NUMBERS (1994); EDWARD S. HERMAN & RICHARD B. DuBOFF, AMERICA'S VIETNAM POLICY. THE
STRATEGY OF DECEPTION 79 (1966); JOHN M. NEWMAN, JFK AND VIETNAM: DECEPTION, INTRIGUE, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 206-22 (1992); JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENTS' SECRET
WARS 239-325 (1986); L. FLETCHER PROUTY, JFK THE CIA, VIETNAM, AND THE PLOT TO
ASSASSINATE JOHN F. KENNEDY 42-117 (1992); PETER DALE SCOrr, THE WAR CONSPIRACY:
THE SECRET ROAD TO THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR 51-75 (1972); NEIL SHEEHAN ET AL., THE
PENTAGON PAPERS AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES 241-78 (1971); SEDGEWICK
TOURISON, SECRET ARMY, SECRET WAR (1995).

With regard to false "body counts," see LOCH K.JoHNSON, AMERICA'S SECRET POWER 6062 (1989); GABRIEL KOLKO, ANATOMY OF A WAR 195-96 (1985); NEWMAN, supra, at 288-89,
298-99.
30. See VANCE HARTKE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS IN VIETNAM 100-02 (1968); HERMAN &
DuBoFF,supra note 29, at 122-23; SEYMOUR HERSH, COVER-UP (1972); KOLKO, supranote 29,
at 195-96; MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR (RobertJ. McMahon ed.,
2d ed. 1995); NEWMAN, supra note 29, at 229-34.
31. See NOAM CHOMSKY, AT WAR WITH ASIA 117-258 (1970); CREDIBILITY GAP: A DIGEST
OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS 54-64 (Len Ackland compiler, 1972); FRANCES FITZGERALD, FIRE
IN THE LAKE 123, 264 (1972); BRUCE PALMER, JR., THE 25-YEAR WAR 92, 95-116 (1984).

32. See THEODORE DRAPER, ABUSE OF POWER 63-65 (1967); GEORGE C. HERRING,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR 134 (3d ed. 1996); ROBERT S. MCNAMARA & BRIAN VANDEMARK, IN
RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM 132-34 (1995).
33. See
83 (1983).

HERRING,

supra note 32, at 244-47;

STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM:

A HISTORY 582-
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lives, and left our former allies in the South to the tender mercies of
their northern opponents.3 4
The government's penchant for secrecy fueled the public's corrosively cynical view of politics and politicians. During the Watergate
investigation, President Nixon proclaimed to the nation that he was
"not a crook,"3 5 but he soon abandoned the Oval Office and joined
his disgraced vice president3 6 in private life.37 In one of the great ironies of modem American politics, the instrument of Nixon's downfall
was a secret recording system installed in the White House.38 What
was supposed to be a tool to record reliably the President's triumphs
became the chief means of exposing the Watergate cover-up.3 9
Under such circumstances, the Warren Commission's Report
would have been subjected to reevaluation even if it had been compiled perfectly. Furthermore, because the Warren Commission labored at the height of the Cold War," the Commissioners adopted a
strategy that depended on implicit public trust. The Cold War environment combined with other circumstances to handicap the Warren
Commission and eventually to erode that public trust in five significant ways.
First, the Commission had access to an enormous amount of information not otherwise accessible to the American press and public.41 This information was secret, top secret, and beyond, much of it
compartmentalized cryptologic and signal intelligence material dealing with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other foreign governments, such
as Communist China.4 2 Because of the enormous Cold War paranoia,
as well as the requirement to maintain tight secrecy around the
sources and methods used to collect this information, the Commission could not argue its case fully to the American people. When the
research community asserted that the government itself had been im-

34. See HERRING, supra note 32, at 282-83; STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE
9-10, 80 (1990).
35. Question-and-Answer Session at the Annual Convention of the Associated Press
Managing Editor's Association, Orlando, Fla., 1973 PUB. PAPERS 946, 956 (Nov. 17, 1973).

36. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew resigned on October 10, 1973, after entering a plea
of nolo contendre to a federal charge of tax evasion. See KUTLER, supra note 34, at 397-98.
37. See id. at 532, 540, 544-45, 547-50, 620.
38. See id. at 452.

39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 287, 314-15, 324-25, 368-69, 447-49.
See Holland, supra note 18, at 52.
See HURT, supra note 6, at 432-33.
See Holland, supra note 18, at 64.
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plicated in the assassination,4 3 the evidence that the Commission had
used to discount such a possibility was available only to the government charged with having abetted the crime. The cost of secrecy was
uncertainty, an uncertainty that turned to cynicism, much of it based
on theories about the assassination that gained legitimacy simply because they could not be tested against the appropriate evidence.
Second, although the Commission had access to some high-quality intelligence information, it did not receive everything. The CIA,
FBI, and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy failed to reveal information that would have helped identify a motive for a conspiracy. 4 The
failure to disclose all information to the Commission was particularly
damaging because of the distinguished character of its seven members.4 5 Its chairman was ChiefJustice Earl Warren, a person noted for
probity and fairness.4 6 The Commission was really divided into two
subgroups. Four of the members-Warren, Hale Boggs, Gerald Ford,
andJohn Sherman Cooper-had relatively little experience with intelligence matters; however, the other three-Richard Russell, Allen
Dulles, andJohnJ. McCloy-were fully conversant with national security issues and the sources and methods used by the intelligence
services.4 7
The Commission's success depended, in part, on the ability of the
three intelligence-savvy members to raise the right questions. They
seem not to have done so. For example, the Commission never discovered the existence of Operation MONGOOSE,4" a covert scheme
concocted by President Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General
43. See, e.g., HAROLD WEISBERG, WHITEWASH II: THE FBI-SECRET SERVICE COVERUP 125

(1996) (concluding that "[t]he FBI and the Secret Service are not innocent" in the Warren
Commission investigation).
44. See WARREN HINCKLE & WILLIAM W. TURNER, DEADLY SECRETS: THE CIA-MAFIA WAR

AGAINST CASTRO AND THE ASSASSINATION OF JFK 16-17, 264-71, 403 (1992) [hereinafter
HINCKLE & TURNER, DEADLY SECRETS]; WARREN HINCKLE & WILLIAM W. TURNER, THE FISH IS
RED: THE STORY OF THE SECRET WAR AGAINST CASTRO 228-31, 336 (1981) [hereinafter
HINCKLE & TURNER, THE FISH Is RED]; NEWMAN, supra note 6; PRAnos, supranote 29, at 211-

17; Holland, supra note 18, at 62.
45. See supra note 16.
46. President Kennedy wrote that Warren had "borne [his] duties and responsibilities
with unusual integrity, fairness, good humor and courage." JIM MARRS, CROSSFIRE: THE
PLOT THAT KILLED KENNEDY 463 (1989) (quoting letter from PresidentJohn F. Kennedy to

ChiefJustice Earl Warren).
47. See Holland, supra note 18, at 52.
48. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S.

REP. No. 94-465, at 139-46 (1975) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE]. Operation MONGOOSE was initiated by the United States government in 1962 as a covert action program

to overthrow Castro, the Cuban leader. See id.
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Robert F. Kennedy, to assassinate Fidel Castro with the help of organized crime.49 When these plans reached the public several years later,
critics of the Warren Commission had a field day.5" The Commission's conclusion that a foreign government lacked a sufficient motive
to murder the President now crumbled.5 ' Indeed, the Commission
looked silly and, even worse, to be a part of the plot because its critics
could plausibly assert that its distinguished members should have
guessed at such a possibility.
Third, in appointing the Commission, President Lyndon Johnson
had one goal: to check rumors that the assassination was a Communist plot.5 2 Johnson appropriately feared that Kennedy's murder
could precipitate World War III.11 Oswald's time in the Soviet Union
and his trip to visit the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City just weeks
before the murder pointed to Communist intrigue. 54 Such concerns
were amplified because Oswald had identified himself with the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee, an organization openly supportive of Castro
and sharply critical of Kennedy's Cuba policy. 55 Thus, the Commission was under enormous pressure to produce an answer that discounted foreign influence.5 6
Fourth, as the science of forensic analysis has progressed over the
past three decades, questions have inevitably arisen about the Warren
Commission's conclusions involving the President's body,57 the alleged murder weapon, the number and sequencing of the shots
49. See CHURCH COMMITrEE, supra note 48, at 139-46; HINCKLE & TURNER, THE FISH IS
RED, supra note 44, at 20, 111-26; Holland, supra note 18, at 62.
50. Even President Johnson expressed his belief that Castro could have planned Kennedy's assassination in retaliation. See HURT, supra note 6, at 31 (citing interview with Lyndon B. Johnson, The CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite (CBS television broadcast, Apr.
25, 1975)).
51. See id.
52. See Holland, supra note 18, at 52.
53. See id. at 56-57.
54. See id. at 57.
55. See id. at 56; see also WARREN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 290-92 (finding
that Oswald purportedly distributed pamphlets on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, but also finding that Oswald exaggerated the extent of his involvement).
56. See Holland, supra note 18, at 57.
57. See WARREN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 19 ("President Kennedy was first
struck by a bullet which entered at the back of his neck and exited through the lower front
portion of his neck, causing a wound which would not necessarily have been lethal. The
President was struck a second time by a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his
head, causing a massive and fatal wound.").
58. See id. at 81 (stating that the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book
Depository "was identified by the FBI as a 6.5-millimeter model 91/38 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle").
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fired at the President,59 and the condition of the so-called "magic bullet," which passed through the President and GovernorJohn Connally
with a minimum amount of damage.6" We now know that the autopsy
performed on the President was problematic, both in technique and
organization.61 Yet, the Commission relied on it. On other matters,
new forms of analysis have been generally supportive of the Commission's findings; although it now appears that the sequencing of the
shots fired in Dealey Plaza was somewhat different from that described
by the Commission. 62 Ironically, even when the latest techniques cor59. See id.at 111 (finding that "(a) one shot passed through the President's neck and
then most probably passed through the Governor's body, (b) a subsequent shot penetrated
the President's head, (c) no other shot struck any part of the automobile, and (d)three
shots were fired.... The evidence is inconclusive as to whether it was the first, second, or
third shot which missed.").
60. See id. at 79 ("A nearly whole bullet was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at
Parkland Hospital after the assassination.").
61. See GRODEN & LIVINGSTONE, supra note 6, at 3.
62. See CharlesJ. Sanders & Mark S. Zaid, The Declassificationof Dealey Plaza: After Thirty
Years, a New DisclosureLaw at Last May Help to Clarify the Facts of the Kennedy Assassination, 34
S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1993).
The so-called "magic bullet" or "single bullet" theory has been the subject of intense
debate. See, e.g., EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, INQUEST: THE WARREN COMMISSION AND THE EsTARLISHMENT OF TRUTH 115-26 (1966) (criticizing the single bullet theory as based on a "misinterpretation" of ballistics testimony, the "extremely tenuous findings of the wound ballistics
test," and the omission of conflicting testimony); MARSHALL HouTs, WHERE DEATH DELIGHTS: THE STORY OF DR. MILTON HELPERN AND FORENSIC MEDICINE 62-63 (1967)

(con-

cluding that a single bullet could not have penetrated seven layers of "tough human skin"
in addition to soft tissue and bones); HURT, supra note 6, at 61-86 (arguing that results of
the spectrographic examination and neutron activity analysis did not support the single
bullet theory); MICHAEL KURTZ, CRIME OF THE CENTURY 175-76, 180-81 (1982) (criticizing
the single bullet theory in light of the condition of the bullet and the deficiencies in the
neutron activity analysis tests); LANE, supra note 6, at 69-80 (concluding that the angles of
impact and the condition of the bullet found at Parkland Hospital invalidated the single
bullet theory); RAYMOND MARCUS, THE BASTARD BULLET: A SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY FOR
COMMISSION EXHIBIT 399, 1-77 (1966) (concluding that bullet 399 "was never fired at any
human target" and that the bullet was "planted" on the hospital stretcher); MARRS, supra
note 46, at 368-71 (concluding that findings from Kennedy's autopsy conflicted with the
single bullet theory); SYLVIA MEAGHER, ACCESSORIES AFTER THE FACT: THE WARREN COMMISSION, THE AUTHORITIES, AND THE REPORT 27-35, 137, 167-70, 461 (1967)

(concluding that

the single bullet theory is weak because, of the three doctors whose testimony supports the
theory, one retracted his original opinion, the second qualified his testimony, and the
third was never shown the Zapruder film or the stretcher bullet); BONAR MENNINGER, MORTAL ERROR: THE SHOT THAT KILLEDJFK 29-43 (1992) (arguing that the single bullet theory
is inconsistent with eyewitness accounts and photographic evidence); F. PETER MODEL &
ROBERT J. GRODEN, JFK. THE CASE FOR CONSPIRACY 61-77 (1977) (concluding that the angle of impact and the pristine condition of the bullet made the single bullet theory impossible); POSNER, supra note 6, at 317, 326-35, 474, 477-79 (relying on "the latest computer
and film-enhancement technology" to conclude that a single bullet could cause both Kennedy's and Connally's wounds, and that a single bullet could have been fired from the
sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository); HOWARD RUFFMAN, PRESUMED GUILTY 53,
131-48, 226 (1975) (concluding that bullet 399 did not cause Kennedy's injuries); SUM-
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roborate the Commission's findings, the result has not been greater
confidence in those findings, but rather, a belief that the Commission
got it wrong instead of almost getting it right.6"
Fifth, the Warren Commission Report-all 888 pages of it-was the
work of lawyers, who not only dominated the Commission, but also its
staff, the true authors of the Report.' The final document reads like
a legal brief supporting the argument that Oswald committed the
crime. The Report ought to have been a dispassionate analysis of all
of the implications surrounding the murder, some of which the Commission itself had no knowledge.6 5 Instead, the Report was a mound
of facts that obscured the issue of Oswald's motivation and portrayed
him as a sullen, dysfunctional, and troubled loner.66 By generating
MERS, supra note 25, at 67-71 (concluding that the pristine condition of the bullet invalidated the single bullet theory);JosAH THOMPSON, SIX SECONDS IN DALLAS: A MICRO-STuDy

9, 30, 38, 56, 59-71, 75, 77, 196, 201-09, 213-14 (1967)
(concluding that the single bullet theory is wrong because none of the shots missed and
because the bullet did not go all the way through Kennedy's neck); Luis Alvarez, A Physicist
Examines the Kennedy AssassinationFilm, 44 AM.J. PHYSICS 813-19 (1976) (using motions of
Zapruder's camera to determine the number of shots fired);John Nichols, The Wounding of
GovernorJohn Connally of Texas: November 22, 1963, MD. ST. MED. J., 58, 76-77 (Oct. 1977)
(concluding that there was no bullet fragment embedded in Connally's thigh and that,
therefore, the single bullet theory is wrong); Nova: Who Shot President Kennedy? (PBS television broadcast, June 19, 1988); The Warren Report (CBS News television broadcast, Part I,
June 25, 1967).
OF THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

Recent analysis has discounted the acoustical evidence brought forward in the investi-

gation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. See infta note 63; Frontline: Who
Was Lee Harvey Oswald? (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 16, 1993); Who KilledJFK: The Final
Chapter (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 19, 1993).
TEE

63. See HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITON ASSASSINATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 95-1828 pt. 2 (1979). The House Select Committee

on Assassinations concluded that the acoustical evidence established that a fourth shot was
fired, and, therefore, there was a "high probability" that two gunmen fired at President
Kennedy. Id. at 65-79. The Committee relied on analyses of a dictabelt recording of the
Dallas police channels. See id. at 66-67. Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. performed the first
analysis and concluded-based on impulse patterns detected from the recording and an
acoustical reconstruction of the assassination-that there was a 50% chance of a fourth
shot from the Grassy Knoll. See id. at 66-72. Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy performed
a follow-up analysis for the Committee and concluded that there was a 95% chance there
was a shot fired from the Grassy Knoll. See id. at 72-75. But see POSNER, supra note 6, at 24042 (arguing that the House Select Committee misinterpreted the acoustical evidence, and,
therefore, it "failed to establish the number of shots ... scientifically").
64. See Holland, supra note 18, at 57-58.
65. See id.
66. For example, the Report made the following findings with regard to Oswald's
character:
Many factors were undoubtedly involved in Oswald's motivation for the assassination, and the Commission does not believe that it can ascribe to him any one
motive or group of motives. It is apparent, however, that Oswald was moved by an
overriding hostility to his environment. He does not appear to have been able to
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such a report, the Commission left open the opportunity for critics to
complain that Oswald was a patsy who did not act alone.6 7
The Report began to sink shortly after its release.6 8 Researchers
used its massive details to challenge the Commission's assumptions
and findings.6 9 However, the veil of secrecy thrown over the intelligence sources prevented the Commissioners and their defenders from
rebutting their detractors. 70 The Commission's Cold War-induced
commitment to secrecy inextricably linked its seven members to the
intelligence community, and when that community subsequently
came under attack, the Commission's reputation suffered as well.7
II.

OTHER INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ASSASSINATION

Between 1964 and 1979, the American intelligence services were
subjected to unparalleled scrutiny, much of it fueled by the CIA's and
FBI's ties to the Watergate debacle and by revelations of domestic
political surveillance by both agencies and the military intelligence
services. 72 There were three other federal investigations that, in dealing with these issues, also addressed the Kennedy assassination: in the
mid-1970s, the Rockefeller Commission,7 3 the Pike Committee,7 4 and
establish meaningful relationships with other people. He was perpetually discontented with the world around him.
WARREN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 423.
67. See, e.g., MARRS, supra note 46, at 91-112 (examining Oswald's life and concluding
that he was a spy for the United States); POSNER, supra note 6, at 410-19 (describing the
rash of criticism following the publication of the Warren Commission Report).
68. In 1966 a public opinion poll revealed that Americans doubted the findings of the
Warren Commission by a margin of three to five. The public's response is recounted in
MEAGHER, supra note 62, at 463.
69. See, e.g., LANE, supra note 6 (criticizing the Warren Commission's interpretation of
objective evidence in the Kennedy assassination); LivrON, supra note 6 (discussing alternative interpretations of the Kennedy assassination evidence); MEAGHER, supra note 62 (comparing raw evidence of the Kennedy assassination with the presentation of that evidence in
the Warren Commission Report).

70. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
72. For an example of the increased scrutiny of the CIA, see VICTOR MARCHET'rI &JOHN
D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 4-12 (1974). See generally JOHNSON,
supra note 29 (discussing the problems of strategic intelligence in a democratic society).
73. See

COMMISSION

ON

CIA

PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON

inafter

ACTTIES WITHIN THE UNITED

CIA

STATES,

REPORT TO THE

ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

(1975) [here-

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION].

74. The Pike Committee Report to the House Select Committee on Intelligence was
never officially released. However, the Village Voice reprinted a substantial part of the Committee's findings. See The CIA Report the CIA Doesn't Want You to Read, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb.
16, 1976 (Supp.); The Select Committee's InvestigationRecord, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 16, 1976, at
72; The Select Committee's Oversight Experience, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 23, 1976, at 60.
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the Church Committee 75 probed matters that touched on matters re-

lating to the assassination and provided, most spectacularly, information about Operation MONGOOSE.7 6 Operation MONGOOSE77
involved CIA plans to destabilize the Cuban government, murder Castro and other leaders of hostile foreign nations, and relied on organized crime to assist with both.78
The most powerful of the post-Warren Commission inquiries was
that made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA),
which in 1976 reopened the investigation that had been seemingly
closed a dozen years earlier. 79 The Committee, chaired by Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio, explored several controversial areas of
John F. Kennedy's assassination, along with those of his brother, Rob75. See CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 48.
76. According to Loch K. Johnson, a series of articles by New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh in December 1974 prompted the creation of all three committees. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 29, at 3-4, 207-08. Hersh revealed, among other abuses, that the CIA had
compiled files on over 10,000 U.S. citizens as part of Operation CHAOS. See id. at 3.
To investigate Hersh's claims, President Gerald R. Ford created the Rockefeller Commission, named after its chairman, Nelson Rockefeller. See ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION,
supra note 73, at ix; see also Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933-34 (1975). The Senate
created a special committee chaired by Frank Church. See CHURCH COMMITTEE, supranote
48, at 1-3 (stating the Church Committee's mandate and scope of investigation). Otis Pike,
the chairman of the House's standing committee on intelligence, investigated for the
House. See supra note 74. The Rockefeller Commission was to decide if the CIA had violated 50 U.S.C. § 403 (the statute creating the CIA), to determine whether there were
adequate safeguards to prevent activities that violated the statute, and to make recommendations to the President and the director of the CIA. See id. at x. The Commission was to
issue its final report within three months and to terminate one month after presenting its
report. See Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933-34. The Commission found, inter alia,
that (1) the CIA's surveillance of mail between the United States and the Soviet Union was
illegal; (2) the declared mission of Operation CHAOS to determine foreign influence on
domestic dissidence was proper, but some activities exceeded the CIA's authority; (3) the
infiltration of dissident groups exceeded its authority. See ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra

note 73, at 20-27.
The Church Committee was created by Senate Resolution 21 with a broad mandate to
determine if there were any "'illegal, improper or unethical'" governmental intelligence
activities. CHURCH COMMrITEE, supra note 48, at 1 (quoting S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975)).
In his introduction to the Interim Report, Senator Church explained that the Committee took up the investigation of assassination plots to continue the task of the Rockefeller Commission. See id. at 2. The Church Committee investigated murder plots against
Lumumba, Castro, Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider. See id. at 4-5. With regard to Castro, it
concluded that "United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to
1965." Id.
77. See supra note 48.
78. See CHURCH COMMITTEE, supra note 48, at 4-5. The Church Committee investigation revealed evidence that, from 1960 to 1965, the United States government used underworld figures and anti-Castro Cubans in a plot to kill Castro. See id.
79. See HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 95-1828, pt. 2, at 9 (1979) [hereinafter HOUSE SELEcr

COMMITTEE].
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ert, and Reverend King. 80 The HSCA suffered from its own limitations, which are beyond the scope of this Article. 8 ' However, the
HSCA's conclusions, which now seem to be in question, held that the
82
Committee could not rule out a conspiracy to kill the President.
This finding directly challenged the Warren Commission.8" For example, the HSCA believed that advanced acoustical techniques
demonstrated that there had been more than one shooter in Dealey
Plaza. 8' That analysis was subsequently repudiated,8 5 but it was too
late to counter the damage done to the Warren Commission's
credibility.
The HSCA exhausted its funds before it could complete its tasks
and left mounds of records behind, including those dealing with organized crime, which the HSCA had subpoenaed, but was unable to
process.8 6 Today these materials are one of the chief objects of the
Assassination Records Review Board.
III.

THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

The findings of these investigations inspired Oliver Stone's 1991
movie.8 7 Without endorsing the movie's sensational conclusions,
many members of Congress decided that the government's refusal to
release classified information about the assassination promoted an unhealthy level of distrust of government.8 8 As a result, Congress passed
the John F. Kennedy AssassinationRecords Collection Act of 19928° (the JFK
Act or Act), which mandated the creation of a five-person Review
Board." The Act orders all federal agencies to assess whether they
80. See id. at 10.
81. See HINCKLE & TURNER, DEADLY SECRETS, supra note 44, at 271 (concluding that the
HSCA suffered from lack of funding and that too much time had passed between the
assassination and the Committee's investigation).
82. See HOUSE SELECr COMMITrEE, supra note 79, at 95 (stating that the Committee

believed "on the basis of the evidence available to it that President John F. Kennedy was
probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy").

83. See id. at 104-09.
84. See id. at 46-47, 65-79.
85. See supra note 63.
86. See HINCKLE & TURNER, DEADLY SECRETS, supra note 44, at 271.
87. SeeJFK, supra note 9. This 1991 Warner Brothers movie fictionally described the
investigations into the John F. Kennedy assassination. See id.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 102-625, pt. 1, at 10 (1992) (stating that unjustified secrecy surrounding the assassination increases doubts and speculation and "fuels a growing distrust
in the institutions of government").
89. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1994).
90. The legislative history and congressional discussion of the need for the Board can
be found in H.R. REP. No. 102-625, pt. 1, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 102-625, pt. 2, at 7 (1992);

1997]

THE NATIONAL APPETITE FOR BOGUS REVELATION

15

possess records relating to the assassination.9 1 All records that an
agency deems as not suitable for immediate release are subject to the
Board's evaluation.9" All records identified as relating to. the assassination must be opened by October 26, 2017, with the exception of
93
records that the President certifies for continued postponement.
The Act defines several categories of information for which disclosure may be postponed, including national security, intelligence
gathering, personal privacy, and presidential security.94 However, because the Act declares a "presumption of immediate disclosure," the
Board will not postpone the disclosure of material unless it is persuaded that there is "clear and convincing evidence" of some harm
that outweighs the public's interest.9 5
Congress intended for the Board to oversee the opening to the
public of a substantial amount of material-perhaps in the millions of
pages.9 6 Congress, therefore, clothed the Board with broad subpoena
and other powers.97 The Board is without precedent in American history, with powers that reach far beyond, for example, the Freedom of

H.R. REP. No. 103-587, at 2 (1994). The law establishing the Board is at 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107(6) (1994).
91. 44 U.S.C. § 2107(5).
92. Id. § 2107(7) (j).
93. See Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 419; Harold C. Relyea & Suzanne Cavanaugh,
PresidentJohn F Kennedy AssassinationRecords Disclosure: An Overview, CongressionalResearch
Service Report for Congress 13-17 (1993) (discussing which particular records can be postponed from release).
94. 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6).
95. Id. § 2107(2) (a).
96. The congressional hearings surrounding the passage of the Act make clear that
Congress expected the Review Board to exercise its powers in favor of opening materials.
See The AssassinationMaterialsDisclosureAct of 1992: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Gov'tal
Affairs on S.J. Res. 282, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Assassination MaterialsDisclosureAct
1]; Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on theJudiciaryon HJ.Res. 454, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Assassination MaterialsDisclosure Act II]; Assassination MaterialsDisclosureAct of 1992:
HearingsBefore the Legislation and Nat'l Sec. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations on
H.J. Res. 454, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter AssassinationMaterialsDisclosureAct III]; The
Effectiveness of Public Law 102-526, the PresidentJohn F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992: HearingBefore the Legislation and Nat'l Sec. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Effectiveness of Public Law 102-526]. The presumption was always to be in favor of opening a document rather than postponing it, thus
making postponement the exception rather than the rule under the law. The Congress
could only guess at the scope of materials to be opened.
97. 44 U.S.C. § 2107(7) 0),

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:1

InformationAct (FOIA).98 The Board's only task is to make the public
record of one epic historical event as complete as possible.9 9
Although the Board's mission is clear, in executing the law it continually confronts the powerful tensions generated by the principled
claims of openness and secrecy. To choose is to lead, and the Board,
in attempting to break new ground in public disclosure, confronts
some profound choices. Those choices have to be informed, moreover, by a shrewd assessment of the public's right to know, the public's
need to have secrets vital to its national security protected, and the
intelligence services' duty to safeguard those secrets and the sources
and methods that produce them.'0 0
The Board's most difficult choices involve the disposition of classified intelligence documents. If a federal agency wants to open
materials, it is not the Board's duty to prevent it. Rather, the Board's
most important task is to decide what should not be opened immediately, in light of the Act's powerful admonition that there be "clear
and convincing evidence" in favor of postponement.1 0 1 In simplest
terms, the Board has to decide whether materials, if opened, would
reveal:
(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires
protection;
(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United
States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or
(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or the conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would
demonstrably impair the national security of the United
States ....

02

The Act provides other grounds for postponement. These include exposure of an informant to a "substantial risk of harm,"' ' exposure of a person to an "unwarranted invasion of personal
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). For a discussion of the history and operation of the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), see generally PatrickJ. Carome & Thomas M. Susman, American
Bar Association Symposium on FOIA 25th Anniversary, 9 Gov'T INFO. Q. 223 (1992).
99. See Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 417-18.
100. See DuVal, supra note 14, at 580-91.
101. 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6).
102. Id. § 2107(6)(1)(A), (B), (C).
103. Id. § 2107(6) (2).
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privacy,"" °4 the possibility of compromising a relationship between a
United States government agent and a confidential source,1 0 5 and the
revelation of a security procedure used to protect the President.1" 6
IV.

OPENNESS AND SECRECY-ORIGINAL INTENTIONS

History offers uncertain guidance about how the Board should
weigh these grounds for postponement against the public's interest in
knowing the facts about the assassination. The Framers of the United
States Constitution did harbor doubts about government, doubts precipitated by their experience in the English Empire.1 0 7 James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, among others, testified eloquently to
the proposition that public accountability was an appropriate measure
of the success of a republic.1 0 ' Still, the Framers were also sophisticated statesmen who valued secrecy in fostering the public good."°
For example, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 conducted its deliberations in secret without any complete record of its debates. 1
The Constitution provides for the maintenance of an executive journal for both Houses of Congress and permits government to publish
its accounts and revenues from "time to time," rather than on demand. "1 Even more fundamental was President George Washington's assertion of a broad degree of presidential discretion in dealing
with foreign relations, war, and peace. 112 In certain circumstances,
secrecy could be justified to attain ends superior to a completely in104. Id. § 2107(6) (3).
105. Id. § 2107(6) (4).
106. Id. § 2107(6) (5).
107. See generally 9JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910) (photo. reprint 1971) (discussing how the Framers of the Constitution were affected
by their prior experiences with the English).
108. Madison wrote, "A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Id. at 103. Jefferson stated:
"No ground of support of the Executive will ever be so sure as a complete knowledge of
their proceedings by the people; and it is only in cases where the public good would be
injured, and because it would be injured, that proceedings should be secret." THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WORD FOR WORD 409 (Maureen Harrison & Steve Gilbert eds., 1993).
109. See MADISON, supra note 107, at 104.
110. See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION 8-12 (1993); see also WILLIAM PETERS, A MORE PERFECT UNION 22-38 (1987) (quoting Thomas Jefferson: "I am sorry
they begin their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of tying up the tongues
of their members.").
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.3.
112. See Refusal by President George Washington to Submit Confidential Correspondence with
John Jay to the House of Representatives, March 30, 1796, in WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE
GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 418-20 (1984).
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formed public. Indeed, the Constitution's Preamble declares that insuring "domestic Tranquility" and providing for the "common
defence" are objectives equal to securing the "Blessings of Liberty." '
On the question of original intention, the evidence is mixed.
Secrets were at once bad and useful, openness was an object to be
pursued, but not at all costs. Since 1787, the government has become
more rather than less accountable, its secrets more rather than less
readily accessible to its citizens. 1 4
V.

OPENNESS AND SECREcY-FOIA

For more than 190 years, the American public did not have a
legal right to gain access to information about its government. 1 5 All
of that changed, however, in 1966 when President Lyndon Johnson
signed FOIA" 6 and thereby altered the historical relationship between the federal government and the public.' 1 7 FOIA presumes that
government information is public information and is implemented by
the judicially enforceable requirement that all federal agency records
be made available promptly upon request, subject only to nine exemptions, which are to be narrowly construed."'
Critics of FOIA seldom doubt its good intentions, but they do
doubt its effectiveness, complaining that the cost of implementing it
113. U.S. CONST. preamble. The Preamble to the Constitution states in full:
WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and

our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
Id.
114. See generally DANIEL N. HOFrmAN,

GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND

THERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981)

THE FOUNDING FA-

(stating that judicial doctrines and

legislative controls on political speech and publication have toughened since 1787).
115. The issue of openness in government has historically been framed in terms of the
right of the government to keep secrets, rather than the right of the public to have access
to governmental records. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacy and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. Rev. 1 (1991). The movement towards greater openness in the post-World War II period has been part of a broader
movement in the twentieth century to hold government accountable for its actions. See id.
As a result, since the progressive era of the early twentieth century, we have seen the institution of public records, open meetings, and "sunshine laws." See id
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
117. The Act has come under criticism from both advocates of openness and proponents of secrecy. See, e.g., Carome & Susman, supra note 98, at 223 (criticizing the Act
because the cost of implementation outweighs the benefits it is supposed to provide); NonDenial How Attitudes and Inertia Combine to Subvert the Freedom of Information Act, KIPLINGER
PROGRAM REP. 1-32 (Summer 1994) (discussing the success of FOIA in providing Americans with a means of acquiring information about their government).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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far outweighs its supposed benefits.' 9 The argument against FOIA
was perhaps best summed up by justice Antonin Scalia, who described
the statute as "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis ignored." 120 Critics like Justice Scalia charge that FOIA harms the government's and
the public's legitimate need for secrecy. 2 '
Many of the most important documents relating to President
Kennedy's murder have been unobtainable through FOIA. 1' Nevertheless, FOLA and the Assassination Records Review Board do share a
common purpose: to break through government's historical habit of
classifying information that otherwise could-and should-be
23
open.'
VI.

THE BUSINESS OF SECRECY

Today, keeping information secret has become a massive industry
in Washington.' 2 4 According to official estimates, the government
took 6.3 million classification actions in 1994, creating an estimated
19 million pages of information that only selected government officials can see.' 25 More than 32,000 government workers are employed
full-time to determine what should be secret, what level of secrecy the
material should have, and whether the documents should be classified. 126 The government holds hundreds of millions of pages of secret documents; indeed, the precise number has gone beyond the
27
government's ability to count.1
The problem of what to do with classified documents is strangling
some government agencies. For example, consider the Department
of Energy.' 2 American makers of nuclear weapons have been classify119. See Carome & Susman, supra note 98, at 223; see also supra note 117.
120. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, 14 AEI J. ON GOV'T &
Soc'y 1026 (1982).
121. See id.
122. See Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 408 & n.2 (stating that without the implementation of the PresidentJohn F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, the records
concerning the assassination would remain classified until the twenty-first century).
123. See 44 U.S.C. § 2107(b) (2) (1994) (stating the purpose of the PresidentJohn F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992); Carome & Susman, supra note 98, at 223
(discussing FOIA and the presumption that government information is public
information).
124. See Ann Devroy, Clinton Eases Government Secrecy Rules: Most Declassification to Become
Automatic, WASH. Posr, Apr. 18, 1995, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, WPost File.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Matthew L. Wald, Millions of Secrets Burden Energy Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1996, at A15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
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ing virtually everything for so long that the Energy Department now
has more secrets than it can handle. 2 9 The Department has 100 million pages of documents that it wants to review for possible release,
but it does not have the resources to do so.'
For more than fifty
years, the Department followed a scheme of classification that might
best be called "classified at birth.1 31 Any document generated was
presumed secret until proved otherwise.' 3 2 The Department and its
civilian contractors have literally lost track of what needs to be kept
quiet.13 3 Even more fundamental, what is genuinely in need of protection-the design of weapons and such-is lost in an ocean of documents no longer worthy of classified status (if they ever were).34
In April 1995, the Clinton administration attempted to break this
classification logjam.1 35 The President issued an executive order
aimed at opening government's oldest secrets to public view, thereby
reducing the number of documents made secret and shortening the
number of years they remain classified.1 36 The primary element of
the order is the automatic declassification without review of most documents that are twenty-five years old or older. 37 Previously, documents had remained classified indefinitely.138 Now, unless the
documents fit into a group of narrow exceptions, they will automati39
cally be open to the public.'
How well the new system will work remains to be seen. Presidents
come and presidents go, but the security bureaucracy remains. Not
only do the intelligence agencies grumble about having to make public that which is most precious to them, but they argue that such declassification is costly and time consuming, especially in an era of
40

diminished resources.1

129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.
§ 435 (1996).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Devroy, supra note 124.
139. See id.
140. See Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Is Slow to Tell Early Cold War Secrets, N.Y. TimF.s, Apr. 8, 1996,
at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
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THE BOARD AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

The JFK Act is an attempt not only to deal with the issue of public
confidence in government,14 but also to forge a model of how we
might keep from sinking in our own secrets. Yet, the intelligence
community resists the opening of classified materials, even those that
are now a third-of-a-century old. This defiance is particularly ironic in
the case of the Kennedy assassination, in that the intelligence agencies
most troubled by the disclosures are the same ones that most often
figure in conspiracy theories. 14 ' Disclosing materials that the CIA and
FBI want postponed might actually affirm that neither a foreign nor
domestic conspiracy existed and demonstrate the vital role they
played in supporting American interests in the Cold War.
Congress never contemplated total disclosure, otherwise it would
not have created the JFK Board.' 4 3 Disclosure is an important public
interest, but so too is protecting sensitive information.'4 There are
many occasions for secrecy. For example, most deliberative bodies
make a virtue of secrecy, because it permits compromise by allowing
individuals to make concessions without losing face.' 45 The Supreme
Court has observed: "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." 146 The Court knows whereof
it speaks, as its decisionmaking process in conference remains entirely
confidential.' 4 7
141. See Assassination MaterialsDisclosure Act I, supra note 96, at 1 (opening statement of
ChairmanJohn Glenn) (observing that "[d]isclosure of information is the only reliable way
to maintain the public trust and to dispel distrust").
142. See, e.g., Exhibit Nine infrap. 54. As early as 1976, the CIA itself acknowledged that
"[c]onspiracy theories have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization." Id.
143. Both the plain reading of the statute and an examination of the legislative history
make clear that Congress expected the Board to protect certain secrets from disclosure.
See 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6) (1994) (identifying the grounds on which the Review Board may
postpone release of assassination materials); Sanders & Zaid, supra note 62, at 419 (explaining the Board's obligations when it decides to postpone release of a document).
144. See DuVal, supra note 14, at 668-71 (identifying 10 justifications for nondisclosure).
145. See id. at 621-22 (observing that maintaining secrecy of advice, recommendations,
and opinions allows officials to "propose, comment, and criticize without concern that
their comments may seem foolish or contrary to popular sentiment" and to compromise
"without loss of face").
146. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (footnote omitted).
147. Secrecy in the High Court is a practice, a matter of the Court's culture and traditions, not of law. See BoB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BREmHREN xi (1979) ("The
Court has developed certain traditions and rules, largely unwritten, that are designed to
preserve the secrecy of its deliberations."). The Justice who tells what took place in conference is indiscreet and is likely to forfeit the respect of otherJustices, but he breaks no law
and neither do his law clerks. See id. Indeed, one of the arguments raised in the wake of
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The virtues of openness in government, therefore, can be and
often are overstated, especially by a self-interested press and media.
Openness does mean that bad advice can be challenged, but the consequence may be that good decisions are never reached. Open
records and "sunshine laws" '48 may only drive people to less easily
documented forms of communication, such as the telephone.1 49
Although the costs and benefits of secrecy and openness in government are not easily calculated, we do know that loose lips still sink
ships, even in our own thermonuclear age.
In the case of the Kennedy assassination, how far are we willing to
countenance secrecy when a fully illuminated rendition of the events
surrounding the President's murder could go a long way to restore
trust in government? At what point do the costs of concealing materials become sufficiently high to our government's credibility that they
are no longer worth paying? At what point do the costs of disclosure
become so great that we compromise our future security? Perhaps
nowhere are these issues more acutely felt by the JFK Board than in
those matters involving intelligence operations.
The assassination sparked a major intelligence effort.15 ° In the
days following the murder of President Kennedy,
[T] he entire intelligence community worked to learn everything it could about Oswald and his murky, superficially contradictory activities. New intelligence reports from Mexico
City suggested a link between Oswald and the Cuban government. The supersecret National Security Agency and allied
eavesdropping agencies went into overdrive to decipher inopening the papers ofJustice Thurgood Marshall was that his written commentary on his
colleagues may have made it more difficult for them to deal with one another now knowing that the public understood the reasons that they held certain positions. See id. at xii
(observing that, because Justices are not elected but are appointed for life, they are not
disposed to allow their decisionmaking to become public). The matter is posed differently, however, in Great Britain. The Official Secrets Acts make it unlawful for a government employee to make an unauthorized disclosure of official information or for anyone
who has received the information in violation of the Act to communicate it to anyone else.
Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 ch. 28, § 2.
148. See Kreimer, supra note 115.
149. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils
and Paybacks of LegislatingDemocratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 664 (1984) (observing that
"to some degree creative government officials and bureaucrats will always be able to devise
ways to abort FOIA's disclosure requirements").
150. See Assassination MaterialsDisclosureAct II, supra note 96, at 93 (statement of Floyd I.
Clarke, Deputy Director, FBI) (noting that "immediately following the assassination, the
FBI began a massive and intense investigative effort"); EPSTEIN, TRILOGY, supranote 6, at 29
(describing Congress's formation of the Warren Commission less than two weeks after the
assassination and the Commission's interaction with the FBI's intelligence efforts).
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tercepted conversations, cable traffic, radio, and telephone
communications at the highest levels of the Soviet and Cuban governments ....

151

The FBI literally asked all of its informants whether they could shed
light on the murder. In addition, there were efforts to tap the FBI's
connection with organized crime to make certain that its members,
angry at the President and his brother, had not ordered the murder
and that Ruby's killing of Oswald was not a classic mob hit.1 52 The
resulting cables and other documents laid bare most of the Cold War
153
intelligence capacity of the United States.
Students of the assassination would benefit from opening the
mass of information produced by the intelligence community's intense effort to get to the bottom of the President's murder. Yet, protecting America's foreign and domestic intelligence-gathering
capabilities is essential to our national defense.154 Thus, the intelligence agencies regularly assert that the identities of agents and informants must remain perpetually confidential; 5 5 that nothing should
be revealed about the methods and sources used to gather intelligence;15 6 that direct reports from United States intelligence agents
should not be disclosed;' 5 7 and that intelligence information provided
by other nations to the United States, and, indeed, the very existence
of such relationships, should not be disclosed.
VIII.

INFORMANTS

Informants play a critical role in the world of intelligence operations, both domestic and foreign. For example, the FBI relied heavily
on informants to infiltrate the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s and
151. Holland, supra note 18, at 54.
152. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 463-64.
153. See Holland, supra note 18, at 54, 56.
154. See Assassination MaterialsDisclosure Act III, supra note 96, at 381 (prepared state-

ment of FBI Director William Sessions) (stating that among 250,000 pages requested by the
House Assassinations Committee are a large number of FBI documents that "implicate
national security interests").
155. See Assassination MaterialsDisclosure Ad I, supra note 96, at 7 (statement of CIA Di-

rector Robert M. Gates) (asserting that "we have an obligation to protect the confidentiality of our sources, regardless of the amount of time that has passed").
156. See Assassination MaterialsDisclosureAct III, supra note 96, at 363, 373-74 (statement

of CIA Director Robert M. Gates) (stating assumption "that there still will be information
that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including ... the exposure of
intelligence sources and methods"); AssassinationMaterialsDisclosure Act 11, supra note 96, at

109 (statement of Admiral William 0. Studeman, Deputy Director, CIA) (echoing Gates's
statement).
157. See supra note 154.
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1970s.15 s Today, the FBI recruits informants to help thwart narcotics
trafficking and international terrorism. 59 The internal security and
general welfare of the United States depends heavily on the role of
1 60

informants.

What duty does the government owe to persons who agree to
serve as informants? There are many reasons why persons serve as
informants. Money, revenge, and the sheer thrill explain some of this
behavior. Yet, above all else, informants expect that they will be
clothed in confidentiality in return for their information. An informant who is identified immediately loses value. All informants in the
service of the various domestic and international intelligence operations are recruited with an understanding that they will be granted
confidentiality-that they will never be "given-up" in the lingo of the
intelligence community.16 ' The very nature of what they are asked to
do-commit treason on their home government, report on the activities of groups like the American Communist Party, or shed light on
the activities of organized crime and terrorist groups-exposes them
to tremendous danger; if they are revealed, they and their families
may suffer serious personal injury, or even death.
The Kennedy assassination documents contain thousands of
names of informants drawn from every walk of life. The FBI has taken
the position that these names must be protected indefinitely and that
any disclosure will impair the Bureau's ability to recruit new informants. Yet, all informants are not created equal. Some have greater
value than others, both for the story of the Kennedy assassination and
for providing information about organized crime and other activities.
Moreover, the issue is not simply one of the quality of the information
158. See Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and
Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 91-92 (1994) (describing the FBI's mishandling of KKK informants).
159. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Critics "Wrong,'CIA Chief Says, WASH. POST,Sept. 6, 1996, at A21,
available in 1996 WL 12392255 (noting CIA DirectorJohn M. Deutch's assertion that critics
who allege that the CIA has done a poor job recruiting informants knowledgeable about

terrorist activities are wrong).
160. See Ross Parker, Confidential Informants and the Truth FindingFunction, 4 COOLEY L.
REv. 565, 596 (1987) (citing an informal examination of federal investigations in the Eastern District of Michigan finding that about 50% of drug cases and 40% of public corruption cases involved the use of informants); Timothy A. Raezer, Needed Weapons in the Army's
War on Drugs: Electronic Surveillance and Informants, 116 MIL. L. REv. 1, 39-64 (1987) (extol-

ling the benefits of informants to drug law enforcement); Zimmerman, supra note 158, at
178 (observing that law enforcement "has long reaped and extolled the benefits of
informants").
161. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III, supra note 96, at 53 (statement of CIA

Director Robert M. Gates) (observing that the CIA files "contain the names of individuals
who provided us information on a promise of confidentiality").
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that is provided. As Exhibit One demonstrates, the vast majority of
documents involving informants has been opened in part; infrequently only the names of the informants and other key identifying
language has been redacted.'
These redactions breed a sense of expectation among researchers, because in the climate of conspiracy
that surrounds the Kennedy assassination, any material that is covered
up is presumed to be an important missing link in the chain of explanation about the murder.
Exhibit One is perhaps representative of the issues raised about
the Review Board's disclosure of informants. The Exhibit contains a
message sent by the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in Houston to
the SAC in Dallas and to FBI DirectorJ. Edgar Hoover on November
26, 1963, four days after the murder of President Kennedy. 6 3 This
document was originally reviewed by the FBI, and designated for release under the terms of the JFK Act with certain materials redacted.
Those redactions appear in Exhibit One and indicate what material
the FBI wanted to keep from the public.' 6 4
As Exhibit Two reveals, the Board decided that much of the redacted material could be released, most notably the name of Mary
Ann McCall, a hostess at a Dallas night spot.1 65 By the time the informant had interviewed McCall, Jack Ruby had already killed Oswald.
The Board decided that the historical record was well served by opening McCall's name, especially given her purported relationship with
the Dallas police and organized crime. The Board, however, also accepted the FBI's argument that the name of the person who provided
the information about McCall should be protected. Consequently, a
document that had many redactions when it was sent from the FBI to
the Board went into the public record with only one name redacted.
The Board was satisfied that revealing the informant's name would
harm the informant, thus outweighing the value of immediate disclosure. The Board used substitute language to make clear to students of
the assassination that the redacted portion was the name of a "confidential informant" and ordered that the name be released in the year
2010.166
Should it matter to the Board that many of these informants,
when interviewed after the assassination, did not provide positive information about Oswald or Ruby? There are countless examples of
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See
See
See
See
See

Exhibit One infra p. 39.
id.
id.
Exhibit Two infra p. 41.
id.
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individuals who, when contacted by intelligence services, indicated
that they knew nothing about the assassination. The Board has taken
the position that intelligence services must demonstrate that harm
would come to the individual if her name were released. Agencies
must be able to identify the individual, indicate that she is still alive,
and establish that some harm will befall her."6 7 The threshold issue,
therefore, is whether an agency that seeks to protect an individual,
regardless of the quality of the information provided, can substantiate
the claim that harm will come to that person as a result of revealing
her name. When an agency has failed to do so, the Board has released the name. 68 The record of events surrounding the assassination will never be complete until we know what blind alleys are not
worth pursuing. As any good investigator knows, eliminating blind
alleys is critical, because the elimination provides additional certainty
about who knew nothing, a fact that can be helpful in discerning who
knew something. In this context, knowing that an informant knew
nothing, at least by her statement, is valuable itself, given the complexity of the conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination.
Spying is a feature of modem foreign affairs, and there can be no
doubt that, as with informants, we owe some protection to those individuals employed in the clandestine service of the CIA.169 Understanding how our clandestine services operate and what information
they did or did not provide is critical to the assassination story. For
example, the CIA sought to protect a considerable amount of information involving the use of double agents to infiltrate the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. As Exhibit Three makes clear, the Agency
originally wanted to protect broad sections of a message sent on November 29, 1963, one week after the murder of the President. 7 ' The
CIA believed that releasing the information would compromise the
167. See 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6) (2) (1994) (permitting postponement of public disclosures
when there is clear and convincing evidence that the "name or identity of a living person
who provided confidential information to the United States ... would pose a substantial
risk of harm to that person"); see also supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
168. The McCall document cited above, and found at Exhibits One and Two, infra pp.
39-42, is an example of the Board's release of an individual's name after determining that
no harm was likely to come to the individual and that public interest in the disclosure
would be high. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
169. The JFK Act acknowledges the obligation of protecting the identity of intelligence
officers. See 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6) (1) (A) (allowing postponement of the release ofJFK documents if they involve public disclosure of "an intelligence agent whose identity currently
requires protection"); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
170. See Exhibit Three infra p. 43. The CIA originally sought to postpone the information that is in the brackets. See id. In some cases, information was postponed, but substitute language, as provided by the statute, was inserted in its place. See id.
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double agents and reveal the scope of the Agency's efforts against the
former Soviet government. Yet, in terms of the story of the assassination, knowing the quality of the effort directed against the Soviets in
Mexico City was considered crucial. As Exhibit Four reveals, only
weeks before Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested for killing President
Kennedy, Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico seeking a
visa that would allow him to return to the Soviet Union by way of
Cuba.17 1 The Board opened most of the information that the Agency
previously wanted to postpone, and where the Board determined that
disclosure would be harmful, it relied on substitute language, which is
72
handwritten in Exhibit Three.1
The CIA also worries about the status of its former employees and
expects that these employees will not reveal the nature of their activities without first seeking the Agency's permission.' 7 If an individual
retires from the CIA undercover, does it follow that historical researchers must forever be denied access to that person's true name,
especially when she is alive and able to answer questions? Does an
agent in the clandestine service of the country have a right to be free
from the prying questions of researchers and reporters? Does it make
any difference, as in the case of informants, that an agent provided
only negative information? Should we worry about whether an agent
is alive or dead? Or does it follow that significant harm might come to
the agent's family and friends through the revelation of her name?
Are we willing, in the interest of providing the fullest and richest historical record of the assassination, to subject spouses, children, and
parents to potential harassment or worse?
Weighing the potential harm to such persons against the public's
right to know is challenging. We should recall that in 1975, Richard
Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, was murdered by unidentified gunmen as he returned to his home from a party at the
ambassador's residence. 174 Former CIA Director William Colby attributed the death to a magazine account that had named Welch only a
171. See Exhibit Four infra p. 45.
172. See Exhibit Three infra p. 43.
173. See Melvin L. Wulf, Introductionto MARCHEi-r & MARKS, supra note 72. In 1972, the

CIA successfully sued former agent, Victor Marchetti, to require that his manuscript be
submitted to the CIA for review prior to publication. See id. at xix.
174. See RHODRIJEFFREYS-JONES, THE CIA AND AMEiucAN DEMOCRACY 211-12 (1989) (observing that "[p]ro-CIA partisans blamed Welch's death on Agency critics who had irresponsibly released too much information"); Jeremiah O'Leary, Cover Blown, CIA Agent in
Athens Killed WASH. STAR, Dec. 24, 1975, at Al (noting that a United States publication's
naming of Welch as the CIA station chief who was slain in Athens will fuel controversy
about tragic consequences of public disclosure of CIA personnel).
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month before."7 5 For those agents who are still alive but in retirement, should we take their word that they are at grave risk? Does a
lifetime of intrigue have as its cost a retirement filled with
uncertainty?
The value of confidential FBI and CIA sources to the Warren
Commission's work is underscored by the documents released thus far
by the Board. For example, Exhibit Four is a letter dated June 17,
1964 from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, then General Counsel to the Warren Commission.1 76 The letter details what
1 77
the FBI knew about Fidel Castro's assessment of the assassination.
Originally classified as "Top Secret," this document indicates that the
United States had a source sufficiently close to Castro to gauge the
Cuban leader's evaluation of Oswald and the circumstances surrounding his visit to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City.1 78 The FBI wished
to redact much of this material. The FBI was concerned that Castro's
tests were at variance with the FBI's test results. The Board decided
that the information contained in the letter was critical to the assassination story;1 7 9 therefore, the entire document was made available to
the American public, illuminating the thinking of Castro and the
credibility of the American intelligence community to assess the Cuban leader.
In matters of informants and agents, the JFK statute directs the
agencies to provide the Board with "clear and convincing evidence"
that disclosure will result in harm, either to an individual or to current
If the FBI, for example, is unable to find a former inoperations.'
formant, and thus does not know whether she is alive or dead, what is
the Board's duty? The Board faces the dilemma of either erring on
the side of protecting the individual's identity, even though there is
no evidence that the person is alive and living under a current threat,
or enriching the historical record by revealing the individual's identity
while running the risk of causing unnecessary harm.
There is also the related question of how to treat the names of
persons described in the reports of informants as being engaged in
some illicit conduct when there is no proof, other than the informant's word, to support the accusation. Is that individual owed a right
175. See O'Leary, supra note 174, at Al.
176. See Exhibit Four infra p. 45.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Parts of the document had been declassified in 1976, but the FBI wanted to continue to postpone release of the portions in brackets. See id.
180. 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6) (1994).
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to know that he or she was so identified, or is it the Board's duty to
redact the person's name? Would disclosing false information be
more damaging than retaining it in government records where only
government officials have access to such information?
These questions indicate the range of issues associated with deciding whether to postpone releasing the names of informants and
agents. Where does the requirement for a full historical record of the
Kennedy assassination yield to the prudential uses of secrecy to preserve the nation's ability to gather intelligence?
IX.

SOURCES AND METHODS

The JFK Act requires the Board to balance the need to protect
sources and methods of intelligence collection with the public need
for disclosure of information relating to the assassination.18 1 The inappropriate release of documents, either in part or in full, dealing
with our intelligence agencies' sources and methods could afford hostile nations, organized crime, terrorists, and drug dealers an understanding of our intelligence capabilities. If another nation or a
terrorist group knows how we are able to exercise surveillance over
them, they are likely to adopt appropriate countermeasures. They
also might seek to provide selectively misleading information, knowing that we are listening and how we are listening. Many of the documents already available in the JFK Collection at the National Archives
indicate that the United States bugged, tapped, photographed, and
otherwise conducted surveillance of persons and places. The question
arises whether we should also reveal the precise kind of equipment
that was used, how it was employed, and against whom it was targeted.
Knowledge about equipment and technique would be important in
evaluating the capability of the intelligence community, not only to
ply its craft, but to organize a conspiracy on its own. Again, the question arises whether disclosing a source, method, or technique should
turn on whether positive or negative information becomes available.
Exhibit Five provides a good indication of the kinds of issues involved in dealing with sources and methods."8 ' This document is a
cable sent from the Director of the CIA on November 23, 1963, only
hours after the murder of the President, seeking information about a
surveillance operation conducted in Mexico City."8 ' The message
181. See 44 U.S.C. § 2107(7) (authorizing postponement of the release of records if the
threat of disclosure "is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest"); see atso supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
182. See Exhibit Five infra p. 47.

183. Id.
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sought information about what the CIA operatives in Mexico City
knew about the existence of tapes and transcripts involving surveillance of the Soviet Embassy there.'
The CIA originally requested
the postponement of much of the information in this document; however, the Board decided that its centrality to understanding the assassination story required its release, with the only redaction being the
name of the authenticating office, whose pseudonym was used in its
place.18 5 Because it helps to clarify the issue of whether the CIA taped
Oswald's conversations in the Embassy, this document is one of the
most significant released by the Board to date. This document also
suggests the CIA's awareness of and interest in Oswald before he purportedly shot the President.
There is also the question of whether the Board should reveal the
identities of those who handled information relating to the investigation of the assassination. America's intelligence machine is a huge
bureaucracy that processes information in staggering quantities."8 6
How and by whom information relating to the assassination was organized, processed, and distributed is central to evaluating the CIA's
role in the assassination. For example, Exhibit Six pertains to the continuing debate about whether the Agency photographed Oswald entering the Soviet Embassy and whether a record of what he had to say
there was ever sent to CIA headquarters.' 7 Arguably, unraveling the
chain of custody of that material is critical. Yet, to do so would require
identifying the persons who handled it. In this instance, the Board
decided that, on grounds of personal privacy and potential harm, it
would not disclose the name of one CIA official involved with the
Mexico City operation, although the names of other officials were released in cooperation with the CIA.
X.

FOREIGN LIAISON

The American government conducts its intelligence operations
in collaboration with the services of other nations.1 8 8 For example,
the most secret agreement ever entered into by the English-speaking
world is the pact by which the United States, Great Britain, Canada,
184. Id.
185. See id. The material enclosed in brackets in Exhibit Five was originally withheld by

the CIA. See id.
186. See AssassinationMaterialsDisclosureAct III, supra note 96, at 397 (photograph depicting voluminousJFK assassination files); Wald, supra note 128 (describing the Department

of Energy's accumulation of information).
187. See Exhibit Six infra p. 48.
188. See STAFFORD T. THOMAS, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 89-94 (1983).
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Australia, and New Zealand carved the world into spheres of cryptologic influence, assigning each nation targets and agreeing to standardize terminology, code words, and other operations procedures. 18 9
Revelations of these and other relationships could prove extremely
embarrassing to the cooperating governments, especially when those
governments profess to be neutral or have publicly stated that they
have no connection with the CIA. However, a full understanding of
the intelligence base upon which the Warren Commission and the
intelligence community as a whole assessed the Kennedy assassination
depends on a thorough accounting of such connections. Moreover,
perhaps nowhere else is negative information more important than
when the intelligence service of another country has access to unique
sources. There is, as well, the related question of how much information was known at the top of the cooperating governments and the
extent to which such knowledge would enhance our understanding of
the assassination as being the work of foreign conspirators. If we compromise any of those relationships and consequently cause political
damage to the cooperating government, we may find a valuable future
source of intelligence closed. 190
Exhibit Seven poses some of these liaison issues. 19 ' The FBI provided the Board with this heavily redacted document, arguing that release of the body of material in the message from the FBI field office
in Paris to the Director of the FBI in Washington on October 12, 1960
(three years before the assassination), would damage the ability of the
United States to work with the intelligence and police operations of a
foreign nation. The cable, however, struck the Board as being particularly important, in that it showed that three years before the murder
of the President the FBI was engaged in surveillance of Oswald's activities.' 9 2 The Board was also concerned that concealing so large an
amount of material would only heighten speculation about the document's significance.

189. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PuzzLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOsT SECRET

AGENCY 309, 315-17 (1982).
190. Congress acknowledged this concern in the JFK Act by allowing postponement of
the release of documents, which clear and convincing evidence establishes will "compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection
between a Government agent and a . . . foreign government" 44 U.S.C. § 2107(6) (4)
(1994).
191. See Exhibit Seven infra p. 52.
192. See id.
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As Exhibit Eight demonstrates, the contents of the cable were far
more sinister when redacted than when they were disclosed in full.19 3
To gain this release, the Board sought the cooperation of the Swiss
ambassador to the United States, who consented to the release, only
with the proviso that the names of specific Swiss officials not be divulged. As a result of the cable's release, we know that the FBI had
knowledge of and interest in Oswald's activities well before the assassination, to the extent of relying on officials of the Swiss Federal Police
19 4
to learn about his possible attendance at Albert Schweitzer College.
XI.

OF

TIMES AND THEORIES

How to address the host of issues raised by these intelligence
materials depends on answers to two overriding questions. The first is
whether the passage of time renders open that which currently requires postponement. The second is whether, by adopting a particular theory about what happened in Dallas, the Board so fundamentally
shapes its assumptions about the significance of documents that it may
actually fail to open the most critical of them.
More than a third of a century has passed since the murder of
President Kennedy. When asked whether the sources, methods, and
techniques used then are no longer worthy of protection today, the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies appropriately answer
no.' 9 5 They argue that disclosure at any time will reduce their capabilities and, hence, our national security.' 9 6 In the world of intelligence
operations, all secrets must live forever, lest we be unable to find new
secrets in the future.
The passage of time, however, has made a difference, and in
some instances dramatically so. There is today no Soviet Union to
which Lee Harvey Oswald could return. If he returned to Minsk, he
would find it a capital of an independent nation, rather than a satellite of the Communist Empire. The Warsaw Pact has dissolved; the
capitals of Eastern Europe now sport trendy shops and capitalist enterprises; Cuba survives by importing tourists from everywhere but the
United States; and China has emerged as a major American market.
Not only is the Cold War dead, but so too are many of the principal
figures in the assassination-President Johnson, Robert F. Kennedy,
John Connally, and Jacqueline Kennedy. The U-2 is regularly fea193. See Exhibit Eight infra p. 53 (observing that Oswald announced his plans to attend
Swiss college, but that he never arrived to attend classes).
194. See id. (documenting FBI's request to Swiss police for information about Oswald).
195. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
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tured on television documentaries; photographs from the once supersecret Keyhole surveillance satellites of the 1960s and early 1970s leap
from the pages of the current issues of Scientific American.19 7 There is
no doubt that the CIA, FBI, and military intelligence services snooped
on us and other nations, friend and foe.1 9 8 The CIA in particular argues that current intelligence activities must remain plausibly deniable and that the Board's role should be to postpone the disclosure of
actions taken a third-of-a-century ago that conceivably could compromise current operations. Yet, we might reasonably ask ourselves, as
the Board has, whether, three decades later, we would compromise
our security interests around the world by indicating that a CIA station
once existed in Moscow.
If the passage of time makes no difference, then the American
people would never have a right to all of the information used or denied by the Warren Commission. The passage of time neuters secrecy, and eventually, like Douglas MacArthur's old soldiers, secrets
just fade away. If there are any secrets that a democratic government
has a right to keep permanently from its people, surely the murder of
the President would not be one such secret.
Then there is the problem of what theory the Board should adopt
to explain events in Dallas. Gerald Posner, for example, has pub197. See Dino A. Brugioni, The Art and Science of Photo Reconnaissance,Sci. Am., Mar. 1996,
at 78. Few secrets were accorded more respect than the techniques associated with'photo
reconnaissance by spy planes and satellites. See id. (discussing 800,000 reconnaissance photographs taken by the CIA from 1960-72 and kept secret). There is now, however, growing
information about the capabilities of the United States during the Cold War. See id.; see also
Stuart F. Brown, America's First Eyes in Space, POPULAR Sci., Feb. 1, 1996, at 42, available in
1996 WL 9275085 (describing the government's declassification of 800,000 photographs);
Philip Chien, High Spies: U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites, POPULAR MECHANICS, Feb. 1996, at
47, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mag File (explaining that one of the original reconnaissance satellites of the 1960s will be displayed at the Smithsonian's Air and Space
Museum).
198. See generally MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE (1977) (describing
the Department of Justice's nationwide campaign to bring down the Communist party of

the United States);

NELSON BIACKSrOCK, COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLT-

ICAL FREEDOM (1976) (describing the FBI's counterintelligence operations and violations
of constitutional rights); WARD CHURCHILL &JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS X
(1990) (describing FBI documents that "expose the secret, systematic, and sometimes savage use of force and fraud, by all levels of government to sabotage progressive political
activity"); FRANKJ. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (1980) (describing U.S. domestic
intelligence operations); BRIAN FREEMANTLE, CIA (1983) (attributing CIA excesses to lack
of direction or misdirection from the Executive Branch and presidency); JEFFREYS-JONES,
supra note 174 (describing how allegations of the CIA's failed operations in Bogota, Columbia led to an expansion of intelligence operations); MARK REIBLING, WEDGE: THE SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA (1994) (discussing the CIA's efforts to assassinate
Fidel Castro); DAVID WISE, THE AMERICAN POLICE STATE: THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE
PEOPLE (1976) (describing U.S. domestic intelligence operations).
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lished a widely read book on the assassination entitled Case Closed.1 99

It concludes that Lee Harvey Oswald murdered President Kennedy,
that he did so acting alone, and that there is no evidence of a larger
conspiracy, foreign or domestic. 200 That notion of the assassination is
countered by a host of critics that insist on just the opposite. 0 1
The general assumptions the Board holds about what happened

inform how it assesses the value of a particular document to the public. If the Board assumes that Oswald murdered the President, and

consequently looks only for information that speaks to his role, it is
likely, on national security grounds, to postpone certain kinds of in-

formation. If the Board assumes that the murder was a conspiracy,
then much of what seems irrelevant to the Oswald explanation may
actually have great currency. 20 2 The intelligence agencies rely on the

199. POSNER, supra note 6.
200. See id. at 472.

201. See, e.g.,

HARRISON

E. LIVINGSTONE,

KILLING KENNEDY

282-334 (1995) (arguing that

Posner's book tricked the public with false scholarship); G. Robert Blakey, Murdered by the
Mob?: 30 Years After the Kennedy Assassination, This Case Isn't Closed, WASH. POST, Nov. 7,
1993, at Cl, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (arguing that credible scientific
and other evidence points to a conspiracy); Jeffrey A. Frank, Who Shot JFK? The 30-Year
Mystery, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1993, Book World, at X4, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wpost File (arguing that Posner "rarely strays from paths staked out by the Warren Commission" and that the "book ultimately becomes an all-too-transparent brief for the prosecution");Jonathan Kwitny, Bad News: Yo'urMotherKilledJFK,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File (contending that Posner "presents only the evidence that supports the case he is trying to build").
Posner related that other reactions to his book included an accusation that he was a
CIA agent, a computer network asking its members to discredit his book, and demonstrators in front of his hotel. See Geoffrey C. Ward, The Most Durable Assassination Theory: Oswald Did It Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, § 7, at 15, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Nyt
File (describing the reactions Posner received from his book).
202. The Board adopted a broad definition of an "assassination record" with just such
issues in mind. See 36 C.F.R. pt. 1400 (1995). The pertinent sections dealing with the
scope for interpreting the JFK statute read as follows:
§ 1400.1 SCOPE OF ASSASSINATION RECORD.
(a) An assassinationrecord includes, but is not limited to, all records, public and
private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document, describe, report on, analyze or interpret activities, persons, or events reasonably related
to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and investigations of or
inquiries into the assassination.
(b) An assassinationrecord further includes, without limitation:
(1) All records as defined in Section 3(2) of the JFK Act;
(2) All records collected by or segregated by all Federal, state, and local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or
inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example, any
intra-agency investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination;
any interagency communication regarding the assassination; any request
by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to collect documents
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and other materials; or any inter- or intra-agency collection or segregation of documents and other materials);
(3) Other records or groups of records listed in the Notice of Assassination Record Designation, as described in § 1400.8 of this chapter.

§

1400.2 SCOPE OF ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND INFORMATION.

The term additionalrecords and informationincludes:
(a) All documents used by government offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents, indices, and other material (including but not limited to those
that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or other identifiers that appear in
assassination records) that the Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board) has a reasonable basis to believe may constitute an assassination record or would assist in the identification, evaluation or
interpretation of an assassination record. The Review Board will identify
in writing those records and other materials it intends to seek under this
section.
(b) All training manuals, instructional materials, and guidelines created or
used by the agencies in furtherance of their review of assassination
records.
(c) All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the
agencies identified or selected assassination records for review.
(d) Organizational charts of government agencies.
(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's:
(1) Records policies and schedules;
(2) Filing systems and organization;
(3) Storage facilities and locations;
(4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes, instructions, guidelines, methods,
and procedures;
(5) Search methods and procedures used in the performance of the
agencies' duties under the JFK Act; and
(6) Reclassification to a higher level, transfer, destruction, or other information (e.g., theft) regarding the status of assassination records.
(f) Any other record that does not fall within the scope of assassination record as described in § 1400.1, but which has the potential to enhance,
enrich, and broaden the historical record of the assassination.
§ 1400.3 SOURCES OF ASSASSINATION RECORDS AND ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND
INFORMATION.

Assassination records and additional records and information may be
located at, or under the control of, without limitation:
(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executing, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government;
(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of state and local governments;
(c) Record repositories and archives of Federal, state, and local governments, including presidential libraries;
(d) Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical societies, and other similar organizations;
(e) Individuals who possess such records by virtue of service with a government agency, office, or entity;
(f) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such
records from sources identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this
section;
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theory that Oswald did it and that he did it alone.2 °s To support such
a position, they turn, ironically, to the findings of the Warren Commission, 20 4 a body that in some ways they attempted to deceive. Perhaps there is no better evidence of the CIA's attitude than its effort to
sway public opinion abroad in the wake of the release of the Warren
Commission Report.20 5 As Exhibit Nine makes clear, the CIA used its
substantial resources to just that end.2 °6
There is considerable irony in the CIA's position, both then and
now. Much of the speculation about the murder of President Kennedy has centered on the role of that agency. 20 7 The only way to sustain its innocence in this matter may well be to fully disclose the
evidence, including selected sources and methods, that will reveal
conclusively that neither it nor some foreign power was behind the
murder.
CONCLUSION

The American public should not rely on the JFK Board to settle
the question of what happened in Dallas and why. That is not the
(g) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have themselves
created or have obtained such records from sources other than those

identified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section;
(h) Federal, state, and local courts where such records are being held under
seal; or
(i) Foreign governments.
§ 1400.4 TYPES OF MATERIALS INCLUDED IN SCOPE OF ASSASSINATION RECORD
AND ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND INFORMATION.

The term record in assassinationrecord and additionalrecords and information includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the JFK Act:
(a) papers, maps, and other documentary material;
(b) photographs;
(c) motion pictures;

(d) sound and video recordings;
(e) machine readable information in any form; and
(f) artifacts.
203. See Exhibit Nine infra p. 54 (contending that "Oswald would not have been any
sensible person's choice for a co-conspirator").
204. See id. (advising that in discussing assassination with "politicians and editors," CIA
personnel point out that the Warren Commission "made as thorough an investigation as
humanly possible").
205. See id.
206. See id. (noting that the American public's belief that Oswald did not act alone "is a
matter of concern to the U.S. Government, including [the CIA]").
207. See, e.g., PROUTrY, supra note 29 (reviewing the history of troubled relations between
the CIA and President Kennedy); ALANJ. WEBERMAN & MICHAEL CANFIELD, Coup D'ETAT IN
AMERICA, THE CIA AND THE ASSASSINATION OFJOHN F. KENNEDY (1992) (asking whether Lee
Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent);JFK, supra note 9.
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Board's mandate.2" 8 The Board is not charged with answering the
question of who murdered President Kennedy. It is not running an
investigation; it is, instead, seeking to disclose documents in an age of
open secrets, an age in which we have come to embrace the idea that
openness is to be preferred and that accountability is the touchstone
20 9
for public confidence in government.
We are reminded almost daily by the press and media spokespersons that the maintenance of secrets is bad, that openness is good,
210
Full
and that accountability in all public matters is highly desirable.
disclosure is to be preferred over partial; the full truth is better than
something less, and the more we know about what government has
done, is doing, and plans to do, the more secure we will be in our
liberties. Yet, the intelligence community charged with making the
case for secrecy often does so as a matter of routine rooted in tradition.2 1 1 Secrecy in a democracy deserves better; it cannot be an end in
itself, and it certainly cannot be justified simply to obscure the intelligence services that generate much of it in the first place. Such an
approach is ultimately self-defeating, both for the intelligence community and for the government it serves.
George Bernard Shaw was correct when he argued: "There are
no secrets better kept than the secrets that everybody guesses. "212
Shaw's words surely describe the approach of the intelligence agencies to the Kennedy assassination. In the absence of disclosure, the
public, goaded by a news-hungry press and an activist research community, will be left to speculate in sensational ways about the assassination. Such speculation will continue to have predictably corrosive
consequences.
We should all be stunned that, with countless documents still hidden in government filing cabinets, researchers, newspaper reporters,
208. See 44 U.S.C. § 2107(2)(b) (1994) (identifying the purpose of theJFKAct as establishing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection of the National
Archives and Records Administration and requiring "the expeditious public transmission
to the Archivist and public disclosure of such [assassination] records").
209. See supra note 14.

210. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 140 (discussing the CIA's slow release of its files on the
most important covert actions of the Cold War). The argument in support of openness
and accountability in government is advanced carefully by NORMAN DORSEN & STEPHEN
GiLLERS, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA (1974).
211. See Wald, supra note 128 (observing that, at the Department of Energy, "ideas are
'classified at birth,' or presumed secret until proved otherwise"); see also supra notes 124134 and accompanying text.
212. CHRISTOPHER MORLEY & LOUELLA D. EVERETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECMOD-

TION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES AND PROVERBS, TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND

ERN LITERATURE BYJOHN BARTLETr

720 (12th ed. 1948) (quoting George Bernard Shaw).
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columnists, and movie and TV producers have managed to convey a
broadly held view that the Warren Commission failed and that the
government knows more than it is telling."' We should stand in awe
of their capacity to explain the assassination in such breathtaking
terms when so much still remains under lock and key. By breaking
confidences with former informants and disclosing clandestine CIA
and FBI operations, a fuller record will put to the test the most sinister
of all conspiracy theories: that the President was murdered by his own
government. Such a matter cannot be left to chance explanation because it eats away at the foundation of public confidence in government, which neither well-intentioned secrecy nor covert operations
can restore.
What Americans require is a greater sense that they can trust
their government to protect the secrets that are genuinely important.
The government's persistent inability to distinguish between what is
vital and what is not2 1 4 lies at the heart of the debate about openness
and secrecy in government, the historical verdict on the Kennedy assassination, and the legitimacy of our intelligence services in an admittedly dangerous world.
Americans have been left guessing about the Kennedy assassination since the Warren Commission issued its report. When everything
is secret, everything is secret-and that is how the intelligence busi1 In the case of the Kennedy murder, however, that
ness operates. 215
strategy has taken a heavy toll. Our task is to accept on a principled
basis the importance of secrets in a democracy and to protect what is
truly valuable and in the public interest to keep secret. Only then will
it be possible to assess whether charges of a conspiracy to murder
President Kennedy are but another example of the virulence of the
national appetite for bogus revelation.

213. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
214. See Wald, supra note 128 (noting that the Department of Energy is spending $3
million on a computer program that will make an initial assessment regarding possible
disclosure of 100 million pages of documents to reduce the number of secret documents to
a manageable quantity for further human assessment).
215. See generally MARCHETrI & MARKS, supra note 72, at 370 (concluding that secrecy has
become a "way of life" for U.S. intelligence operations).
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EXHIBIT ONE

URGENT

11-26-63

8-05

PM

VBR

DIRECTOR AND SAC, DALLAS

TO

FROM SAC, HOUSTON . 4-939
JACK LEON RUBY, AKA.
VICTIM.

2P
LEE HARVEY OSWALD, AKA. DASH

CR.

ON NOVEMBER TWENTY SIX INSTANT,

SREPORTED

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION HAD WITH

=

DALLAS ON NOVEMBER TWENTY FIVE
KNOWN TO INFORMANT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS,

LAST.

IS REPORTED TO BE QUOTE FIXER UNQUOTE AND QUOTE PAY OFF
CONTACT UNQUOTE BETWEEN
DURING PHONE CONVERSATION INFORMANT ASKED
IF SHOOTING OF OSWALD WAS AN ACCIDENT AND SHE REPORTEDLY
WAS

STATED QUOTE NO, I DON-T THINK SO UNQUOTE.

ASKED TWO OR THREE TIMES IF IT WAS ACCIDENT AND EACH TIME
/

SHE SAID IT WAS NOT BUT REFUSED TO MAKE FURTHER
STATEMENT OR CLARIFICATION ON PHONE, STATING TO INFORMANT
QUOTE YOU KNOW HOW IT WORKS UNQUOTE.
END PAGE ONE

SEVRCED_..I._.lJN

JOV2

61963j.

FBI-DA.LAS

40
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PAGE TWO
INFORMANT TO PERSONALLY CONTACT

W

HILE IN DALLAS

ON LEGITIMATE BUSINESS ON NOVEMBER TWE1TY SEVEN OR TWENTY
EIGHT, NEXT.

9J~

HOUSTON WILL FOLLOW AND REPORT RESULTS OF

CONTACT.
INFORMANT STATES

WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH.BUREAU

AND WILL DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENT.

HOUSTON RECOMMENDS

NOT BE INTERVIEWED AT THIS TIME

IN ORDER THAT INFORMANT WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED.
END AND ACK

WA ADV SEP
DL
DL

HOLD
83

D-09 PM CST OK FBI DL

LJH

56:1
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URGENT

11-26-63

TO

D

CTOR AND SAC, DALLAS

FROt

SAC, HOUSTON

0

7-49

44-939

JACK LEON RUBY, AKA.
CR.

VICTIM.

PM

VBR

T

2P
LEE HARVEY OSWALD, AKA. DASH
O>T

'-

I

ON NOVEMBER TWENTY SIX INSTANT,
REPORTED TELEPHONE CONVERSATION HAD WITHARY

!
"CL

HOSTESS, BACHELOR-S CLUB,DALLAS ON NOVEMBER TWENTY FIVE
LAST.

E!C

CALL] KNOWN TO INFORM'ANT

FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS,

IS REPORTED TO BE QUOTE FIXER UNQUOTE AND QUOTE PAY OFF
CONTACT UNQUOTE

ETWEEN DALLAS POLICE AND CRIMINAL ELEMENT3

DURIG PHONE CONVERSATION' INFORIIANT ASKED

C CAL3

\\STATED

IF SHOOTING OF OSWALD W:!ASAN ACCIDENT AND SHE REPORTEDLY

QUOTE NO. I DON-T THINK SO UNQUOTE. VC CAL WAS

ASKED TWO OR THREE TIMES IF IT WAS ACCIDENT AND EACH TIME
SHE SAID IT WAS NOT BUT REFUSED TO MAKE FURTHER
STATEMENT OR CLARIFICATION ON PHONE, STATING TO INFORMANT
QUOTE YOU KNOW HOW IT WORK'S UNQUOTE.
ZiD ?AGE ONE

362

.

I
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PAGE TWO

INFORMANT TO PERSONALLY CONTACTEC CALL WHILE IN DALLAS
ON LEGITIMATE BUSINESS ON NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVEN OR TWENTY
EIGHT,

NEXT.

HOUSTON WILL FOLLOW AND REPORT RESULTS OF

CONTACT.
INFORMANT STATESIC CALL WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH BUREAU

AND 1ILL DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENT.

/

HOUSTON RECOMMENDS [IC CA INOT BE INTERVIEWED AT THIS TIME

IN ORDER THAT INFORMANT WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED.
END AND ACK
DL ADV SEP
WA

KS-53 P14 OK FBI WA LLD

TU CLR

1997]

THE NATIONAL APPETITE FOR

BOGus

REVELATION

EXHIBIT THREE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW "'OGRAM
RELEASE. AS SAI iizED
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S YBAT GPFLOOR LCIMPROV-

STATIONBEDOUBLEAGENTS HAVE NOT HAD

MEETINGS WITH SOVS SINCE ASSASSINATION.

THIS PRINCIPALLY DUE

FACT THAT PRIOR ZZ NOV THE SOV.S SC EDULED FUTURE SESSIONS FOR
PERIOD BEGINNING CIRCAJlyECJALSO DUE FACTOR THAT ONE AGENT
THAT ANOT ER AGENT
LI lJENNET-1) OUT OF TOUCH WITH SOV C/O0AND
rL,,LE-1) OUT OF COUNTRd
z- !"7....
.

d1_,sigcti , et;141 ics
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A

A

-- TEASE-!3

. WILL HAVELINLE-3MEET

H AVE SEPARATELY ADVISED HUS RE

STATION'S PROPOSAL RE[INEB -1MEETING WITH SOY.
3.

REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TACTIC OR ELICITATION

EFFORT IF ANY THAT[OUBLEASHOULD MAKE.
4.
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EXHIBIT FOUR
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Castro Is Bald to have expressed the oonolnsion that
could not hm fired thre ties
In succession and
hit the target With the telescopio sight in the available t,that he would have hoeedee two other men in order for the three shots to have been fired in the time Interval. The souroe
commented that on the basis of Castro's remarks, it was clear
that his beliefs were base on theory as a result of Cuban
experiments and not on any firsthand Information in Castr6's
possession. In this connection, it should be noted that the
FBI Laboratory firearms exports made tests and determined that
three shots could be fired with the knd of riflo and sight
used by Oswald in the five to six seconds which were available.
The Laboratory noted, however, tha
did nt begn
until after the firing of the first
It will be noted that the info
t -on furnished by
our source at this time as having coe from Castro is consistemt with and substantially the same as that which appears In
.Catro's a
csh of Novenbor. 27, 1963, -and which Is0 referred
to above. A
This additional material is set forth for the
Comission's 4-2ornation and nq further action is contemplated
-by this Duro.-- concerning it.
Sincerely yours.
J.EW~m
NCO-v

NOTM: (continued)
This letter is classified "Top Secret" in view of the'nature
of our source, the disclosure of which would seriously damage
national defense interests.0
.
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7,
WEE

ENVOY TAPES AND

jSINCE 27 SEPTEMBER TO LOCATE ALL MATERIAL

POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SUBJECT REF.

IF
Z. DISPATCH SOONEST BY SPECIAL COURIER, STAFFER
TAPES IF
NECESSARY.EFULL TRANSCRIPTS AND ORIGINAL

AVAILABLE]ALL PERTINENT MATERIAL.
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3. EARE ORIGINAL TAPES AVAIL-ABLE ?

END OF MESSAGE
63, an American male who said
CS Comment: *Reported that on I October
Embassy in Mexico City.
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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

)&1 (1---, "jo 7

RE.ASE AS SANITIZED

-- 1995

,

of Relevant Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD at
SOMMARY
23. November 1963.

1.

Our first

information on OSWALDcame fro-C.technical

Mexico City and was cabled in on 9 October 1963.

operatioin

It

revealed that on 1 October 1963 Lee OSWALD
had been in touch there
with Soviet Consul Valery KOSTIKOV about a telegram which the
Soviet Embassy vas supposed to send on him to the Soviet Embassy in
Washington.

The data showed that OSWALD had also been at the Soviet

Embassy on 28 September.

was a former U. S.
Traces shoved OSWALD

defector to the USSR and on 10 October CIA Headquarters notified the
had been a Marine).
FBI, State and the Navy (OSWALD

Our Mexico Station

was told to pass its information on OSWALD to the Mexico City offices
of the FBI, the Ti-gration and Naturalization Service and the Embassy.
Since our Agency is not supposed to investigate U. S. citize52s abroad
ex

without special request,

we did nothing further on the case.

Q,

2.
a
0
.2

After the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November,

Mexico Station, which immediately recalled its earlier report on OSWALD
and cabled us about it,

began researching all

reports which might relate to him.
0

its

files and records for

It turned up pictures of a man

believed to be OSWALD entering the Soviet and Cuban Embassies on
various days in October, including 1 October, but when some of these
pictures were sent to the FBI in Dallas they proved to be someone other
CLASSIFICAT
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.
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/ 00
than CWALD.

Mexico Station has, to date, found no pictures of

OSWALD entering the Soviet or Cuban Embassy.

3.
however.

The search did reveal more Atlnt fromFtchnical opertiosJ,
This information, which comes in in great masses, had not

been previously associated with OSWALD because his name is not
actually mentioned in it,

but the subject matter shows it

is about

him, [nd our expert monitor says the voice is identical with the
voice of 1 October known to be OSWALD's
i4. This fu1therEechnicalinformation covers a round-robin of
telephone calls and visits which OSWALD made to the Soviet and Cuban
Embassies in Mexico City between 27 September and 3 October 1963.
This has been supplemented by reports on his travel in and out of Mexico
obtained by the U. S. Consulate in the border town of Nuevo Laredo from
Mexican Imaigration Service records.

5.

In brief, all this information shows that Lee Harvey OSWALD

entered Mexico (apparently by car) at Nuevo Laredo on 26 September
1963,

claiming he was a photographer,

for Mexico City.

living in New Orleans and bound

On 27 September he was in Mexico City phoning the

Soviet Embassy to ask for a visa so he could go to Odessa, USR.

On

28 September, he was at the Cuban Embassy, and Silvia DURAN,a Mexican
Employee of the Cuban Embassy, telephoned the Soviet Embassy about his
problem.

It seems that OSWALD
(whose name is not mentioned) wanted a

Cuban transit visa so he could go to Cuba and wait there for a Soviet

50
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-3visa which would permit him and his wife to go on to the Soviet
Union.

Silvla DURANasked assurance that the Russians would grant

him the visa.

A while later a Soviet official calls Silvia DURAN

back and explains that the visa applicant had been dealing with
the Soviet Consulate in Washington about the same matter and that
they could not be sure that he would ever get the Soviet visa.
The Soviet official added that the applicant had a letter showing
he belonged to an organization in favor of Cuba.

Silvia DURANand

the Soviet official agree to table the matter.
6. On 28 September 1963, OSWALD again visits the Cuban Embassy.
and talks to Silvia DURAN about the same matter, and she phones the
Soviet Embassy. OSWALD
also talks to a Soviet official on her phone
and says he will come to the Soviet Embassy and give him what is
apparently a forwarding address where he can be reached.

There is

some hint this address may be in Cuba.
7- On 1 October, OSWALD has his phone conversation with Soviet
Consul KOSTIKOV about his visa, and on the same day, OSWALD phones
the Soviet Military Attache about the same matter.
gives him the nvber of the Consul.

The Military Attache

Finally, on 3 October, OSWALD

phoned the Military Attache again and tried to talk about a visa, but
the Military Attache again referred him to the Consul end give him
the right phone number.

8. That same day, 3 October 1963, OSWALD drove back into the
United States-at the Nuevo Laredo-Laredo, Texas crossing point.

He
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bad travelled on a Mexican Tourist Card in lieu of passport.

9. On 23 November 1963, Maxican authorities,[

Jand vh

had noticed the name of

Lee OSWALD In it,arrested Silvia DURAN and her husband end interrogated
them.

She confirmed the information given above, saying that Lee

OSWALD had professed to be a Communist and an aImirer of Castro.

She

and her husband are being held incomunicado and their arrest will
not be mafe known, for the time being.
10.

Observation of the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico

and of their principal intelligence officers, including KOSTflOV,
since the assasination of President Kennedyr, byot

technical and]

physical surveillance, shows nothing unusual.
11.

Mexican President Lopez Mateos is aware of this cas
-3 He will doubtless support any

further police action which is necessary.
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EXHIBIT SEVEN

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
Of THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .

American Embassy
Paris

*

Date:

8,

France

October 12, 1960

*To:

Director,

FBI

.. q

Prom:

Legat, Paris

Subject:

LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

55)

SECRET

(105-1067)

0
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Re Paris letter
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EXHIBIT EIGHT

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

UNITE

OF THE
STATES OF AMERICA

'merican REbassy
8, France
Paris

"N'

;r

Date:

October 12, 1960

To:

Director,

From:

Legat, Paris

Subject:

LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

nl

P-95

FBI

.-

(105-07)

Re Paris letter 9/27/60.
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th
school for the course bei
at tue College revealed tnat Re nas not arrived there up to
the Present time. He had originally written a letter from
Moc.w indiating his intention to attend there. A letter
which was addressed to him at this address by his mother
was returned to her since his whereabouts are unknown to the
college. The Swiss Federal Police advised that it is unlikely
that he would have attended the course under a different
fn. the
name. The Swiss Federal Police advised that coursR
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EXHIBIT NINE

DISPATCH
Chiefs , CertainBStati'onsand Bases
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1. O
r
Concern.
rom the day of Preident Kc
zedy's
assasi atiomn on,
dthere
has been speculation
the restonibilit7
edout
for his murder
Althou h

thns oas steped for a time by the Warren Commission report (which appeared at
the end of September 196 a varlous fiters 'have now chad time to sca"the
W
Commission's published report and documents for new pretexts for questiohing,
and there has been &,new wave of books and articles criticizing the Conmnission's
findings. In most cases the critics have speculated as to the existence of some
kind of conspiracy, and often they have implied that the Commission itself was
involved. Presumaly as a result of tihe increasing challenge to the Warren

S
S
1

Commission's Report,

a public opinion poll recently indicated that

46% of the

American public did not think that Oswald acted alone, while more than half of
those polled thought that the Commission had left some questions unresolved.
Doubtless polls
abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results.
2.. This trend of opinion is
a matter of concern to the U.S. government,
including our organization.
The members of the Warren Commission were naturally
chosen for their integrity, experience, and prominence.
They represented both
sections
were deliberately drawn from all
staff
and they and their
mnjor parties,
of the country. Just because of the standing of the Commissioners, efforts
to
Imp5n their
rectitude and wisdom tend to cast doubt on the whole leadership of
American society.
Moreover, there seems to be an increasing tendency to hint
that
President Johnson himself, as the one person who might be said to have
benefited, was in some way responsible for the assassination.
Innuendo of
such seriousness affects not only the individual concerned, but also the whole
reputation of the American government.
Our organization itself
is
directly
involved:
among other facts,
we contributed information to the investigation.
Conspiracy theories have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization, for
exeple by falsely
alleging that
Lee Harvey Oswald worked for us.
The aim of
this
dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims

of the co3nspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of such claims in
other countries.
Background information is
in a nunber of unclassified attachments.
3.
tion

Action.

We do not

be initiated

where it

supplied in

a classified

section and

recommend that
is

discussion of the assassination quesnot already taking place.
Where discussion is

active, however, addressees are requested:
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a. To discuss the publicity problem with liaison and friendly elite contacts
(especially politicians and editors), pointing out that the Warren Commission
possible, that the charges of the
made as thorough an investigation as hnly
critics are without serious foundation, and that further speculative discussion
only plays into the hands of the opposition. Point out also that parts of the
conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist propagandists.
Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded and irresponsible

speculation.
b. To employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the
critics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for

this purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide
useful background material for passage to assets.

Our play should point out,

as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted before the
evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iII) financially interested, (iv)
hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated with their own theories.
In the course of discussions of the whole phenomenon of criticism, a useful
strategy may be to single out Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached
Fletcher Knebel article and Spectator piece for background. , (Although Mark

Lane's book is much less convincing than Epstein's and comes off badly where
contested by knowledgeable critics, it

is also much more difficult to answer

as a whole, as one becomes lost in a morass of unrelated details.)
in

4. In private or media discussion not directed at any particular writer, or
attacking publications which may be yet forthcoming, the following argumnents

should be useful:
a. No significant new evidence has emerged which the Commission did not
consider. The assassination is sometimes compared (e.g., by Joachim Joesten
and Bertrand Russell) with the Dreyfus case; however, unlike that case, the

attacks on the Warren Commission have produced no new evidence, no new culprits
have been convincingly identified, and there is no agreement among the critics.
(A better parallel, though an imperfect one, might be with the

eichstag fire

of 1933, which some competent historians (Fritz Tobias, A.J.P. Taylor, D.C. Watt)
now believe was set by Van der Lubbe on his own initiative, without acting-for
either Nazis or Communists; the Nazis tried to pin the blame on the Communists,
but the latter have been much more successful in convincing the world that the
Nazis were to blame.)
b. Critics usually overvalue particular items and ignore others. They tend
to place more emphasis on the recollections of individual eyewitnesses (which
are less reliable and more divergent -- and hence offer more hand-holds for
criticism) and less on ballistic, autopsy, and photographic evidence. A close
examination of the Commission's records will usually show that the conflicting
eyewitness accounts are quoted out of context, or were discarded by the Com ission for good and sufficient reason.
c. Conspiracy on the large scale often suggested would be impossible to conceal in the United States, esp. since informants could expect to receive large
royalties, etc. Note that Robert Kennedy, Attorney General at the time and
John F. Kennedy's brother, would be the last man to overlook or conceal any
conspiracy. And as one reviewer pointed out, Congressman Gerald R. Ford would
hardly have held his tongue for the sake of the Democratic administration, and

Senator Russell would have had every political interest in exposing any misdeeds
on the part of Chief Justice Warren. A conspirator moreover would hardly choose
a location for a shooting where so much depended*on conditions beyond his control: the route, the speed of the cars, the moving target, the risk that the
.assassin would be discovered. A group of wealthy conspirator could have
arranged much more secure conditions.
d. Critics have often been enticed by a form of intellectual pride: they
light on some theory and fall in love with it; they also scoff at the Comnission because it did not always answer every question with a flat decision one
way or the other. Actually, the make-up of the Commission and its staff was
an excellent safeguard against over-commitment to any one theory, or against
the illicit
transfomation of probabilities into certainties.
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e. Oswald would not have been any sensible person's choice for a coconspirator. He was a "loner," med-up, of questionable reliability
and an unknown quantity to any professional intelligence service.
f. As to charges that the Co-ission's report was a rush job, it emerged
three months after the deadline originally set. But to the degree that
the Commissionfried to speed up its reporting, this was largely due to
the pressure of irresponsible speculation already appearing, in some cases
coming from the same critics who, refusing to admit their errors, are now
putting out new criticisms.
g.
Such vague accusations as that "moo than ten people have died mysteriously" can always be explained in some more natural way: e.g., the individuals concerned have for the most part died of natural causes; the Com1
mission staff questioned 4d
witnesses (the FBI interviewed far more
people, conducting 25,000 interviews and reinterviews), and in such a
large group, a certain number of deaths are to be expected. (When Penn
Jones, one of the originators of the "ten mysterious deaths" line, appeared on television, it emerged that two of the deaths on his list were
from heart attacks, one from cancer, one was from a head-on collision
on
a bridge, and one occurred when a driver drifted
into a bridge abutment.)

5.
Where possible, counter speculation by encouraging reference to the
Commission's Report itself. Open-ninded foreign readers should still be
impressed by the care, thoroughness, objectivity
and speed with which the Commission worked. Reviewers of other books might be encouraged to add to their
account the idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far
sunerior to the work of its critics.
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